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Through its Food Security Project, the Directorate of Economics of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries maintains two publication series for results of research on food
security issues.  Publications under the Flash series are short (3-4 pages), carefully focused
reports designed to provide timely research results on issues of great interest.  Publications
under the Research Paper series are designed to provide longer, more in-depth treatment of
food security issues.  The preparation of Flash reports and Research Reports, and their
discussion with those who design and influence programs and policies in Mozambique, is an
important step in the Directorates's overall analysis and planning mission.
Comments and suggestions from interested users on reports under each of these series help
identify additional questions for consideration in later data analysis and report writing, and in
the design of further research activities.  Users of these reports are encouraged to submit
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Mozambique, at peace since 1992 after three decades of civil strife, must increase
agricultural production in order to feed its rapidly growing population. Intensification
(increasing yields on land already under cultivation through the use of inputs such as
chemical fertilizer, improved varieties of seed, and pesticides) is an important part of this
strategy.  The country’s prime agricultural lands are already densely populated, and the
presence of tsetse fly in the productive northern areas makes area expansion through the use
of animal traction difficult.  
Current yields of major food and export crops in Mozambique are low in comparison with
other African countries
1, and the use of improved inputs is extremely limited.  During 1991-
95, Mozambique used 1.84 kg of NPK per hectare of arable land, compared to 16.55 kg/ha in
Southern Africa
2, 8.89 kg/ha in sub-Saharan Africa overall, 54 kg/ha in Latin Ameria, and
80.3 kg/ha in Southern Asia (Naseem and Kelly 1998).  Although many smallholders
received improved varieties of seed through emergency programs during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the programs have now ended and farmers are replanting  instead of purchasing
new seed. 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
This report summarizes an appraisal of input utilization and marketing in Mozambique,
focusing on the following research questions: (1) what are current smallholder yields for
major commodities, and what is the potential for increasing yields through the use of
improved technologies?  (2) to what extent are improved technologies already being used by
smallholders, and is the use of improved technologies profitable?  (3) how are improved-vi-
seeds, fertilizer and pesticides currently produced and distributed? and (4) what are the key
constraints and opportunities for increasing the use of improved technologies by
smallholders?
A two-part approach was used to gather data. First, key informants and reports (from
government agencies, NGOs, donors and international organizations) were consulted to
obtain information on yields, levels of technology adoption, and production and distribution
channels for seed, fertilizer and pesticides.  Second, an in-depth analysis of one of the
country’s leading efforts to promote intensification was carried out.  A survey of 223
smallholders participating in the Direcção Nacional de Extensão Rural/Sasakawa-Global
2000 program (DNER/SG2000) was undertaken to evaluate the financial and economic
profitability of the improved maize technology package as applied by farmers in Manica and
Nampula Provinces during 1996/97.  
KEY FINDINGS ABOUT THE INPUTS SUBSECTOR
Use of Improved Inputs by Smallholders is Limited to Cotton and Tobacco Contract
Growing Schemes and Greenbelt Vegetable Production   During the early 1980s
Mozambique used 40,000-80,000 tons of fertilizer and 2-3 million liters/kilograms of
pesticide per year, reflecting large investments in the state farm sector made by the
Mozambican government and donors.  Agrochemical use fell dramatically through the mid-
1980s due to the war and collapse of the state farm sector. Current fertilizer and pesticide
consumption is less than 10,000 tons and 400,000 lt/kg respectively.   
Most agrochemicals currently imported are channeled by the three large joint venture
companies (JVCs) and other smaller cotton and tobacco companies to their smallholder
outgrowers.  State sugar and citrus enterprises and large private producers of maize, rice,
processing tomatoes, and other vegetables, tea and tobacco consume smaller amounts.  Only
an estimated 7% of smallholders use purchased inputs.
Large commercial farmers producing maize and vegetables and some smallholder producers
of vegetables purchase improved varieties of seed annually through formal channels such as-vii-
the Mozambican seed company SEMOC.  Substantial quantities of improved seed for staple
food crops were provided to Mozambican smallholders through emergency distribution
programs during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  These distributions met over half of the
estimated annual seed demand for principal food crops.  Most of these programs have now
ended and up to 80% of the seed used by smallholders is saved from year to year
(Dominguez and Chidiamassamba 1997).
  
Substantial Yield Gains are Possible Through the Use of Improved Inputs, but Fine-
Tuning Recommendations to Agroecological Conditions is Very Important.  A summary
of available evidence indicates that the use of improved seed and fertilizer technologies could
increase the yields of major crops by 67-576%.  Current average and potential yields (in
parentheses) are: maize 0.4-1.3 tons/ha (5-6.5); sorghum 0.3-0.6 tons/ha (0.8-2); rice 0.5-1.8
tons/ha (2.5-6); beans 0.3-0.6 tons/ha (0.5-2.5); cassava 4-5 tons/ha (5-10); cotton 0.3-0.6
tons/ha (1.2) (MAP 1997, World Bank 1996).
The response to fertilizer and improved varieties varies widely depending on the
agroecological zone and soil type.  This implies that recommendations should be fine-tuned
to the soil type and zone if farmers are to maximize financial benefits.  For the soil types
found in the DNER/SG study areas, N and P recommendations for maize ranged from 30-
100 kg/ha and 0 to 60 kg/ha, respectively (Geurts 1997).  The actual amounts of N and P
applied on DNER/SG plots were 58 and 24 kg/ha in all cases, usually a much lower rate than
recommended.  An additional 12 kg/ha of potassium was applied on the DNER/SG plots,
although this was not recommended for any of the crop/soil/agroecological zone
combinations.  
Outside of Contract Growing Schemes, Smallholder Access to Improved Inputs Is
Extremely Limited.  Through the 1980s the parastatal Interquimica imported all
agrochemicals and Boror Commercial, another parastatal, distributed them through a network
of retail outlets.  Both firms have subsequently been privatized and companies are now free
to import agrochemicals.  The closure of Boror Commercial retail outlets and the scarcity of
private retail outlets for agrochemicals outside of Maputo have severely restricted small and
medium-scale farmers’ access to inputs.  Large agricultural enterprises which are the major3 Research suggests that cotton production, especially when intensified, has positive spillover effects
on food crop production among participating farmers.  See Strasberg (1997) for more details.
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users of fertilizer and pesticides now obtain inputs in one of several ways: by ordering
through private companies representing multinational firms such as BASF or Ciba-Geigy,
ordering inputs directly, or obtaining inputs through donor aid programs (Pantazis 1997).  
The KRII Aid Program Has Been Ineffective in Assuring a Reliable Supply of High
Quality Inputs to Smallholder and Larger Growers.  The KRII program has been
operating since 1986 and supplies an estimated 1/3 of national pesticide demand and virtually
all fertilizer used in Mozambique.  These in-kind grants are worth approximately $9 million
per year.  KRII is intended to support smallholder food production, but in practice most of
the inputs are routed to large companies for use (often by smallholder contract growers) on
cash crops such as cotton and tobacco.
3  Recipients of KRII agrochemicals are supposed to
pay a countervalue of 2/3 FOB for pesticides and 2/3-100% CIF for fertilizers and equipment
into an agricultural development fund, but in practice a large part of the countervalue goes
uncollected (World Bank 1996).  
Companies can access KRII agrochemicals in two different ways.  First, they can directly
request specific products and quantities through the KRII program.  Doing so is cheaper than
ordering through agrochemical representatives or directly from the international market, but
companies may be responsible for paying the countervalue, there is considerable uncertainty
about when the inputs will arrive (it may take up to 18 months between order and delivery)
and companies may also have to pay large storage fees if the inputs sit at the docks for a long
period.  In practice, a large part of KRII program imports go unclaimed and are auctioned off
after one or two years.  This provides a second, even cheaper way to get agrochemicals, if
users can find what they need.    
Creating a Demand for Purchased Seed Among Smallholders Has Been Difficult After
Many Years of Free Seed Distribution.  Development of the seed subsector since the 1970s
has concentrated on the establishment of a formal seed industry similar to those in more
developed countries.  Formal seed production (non-cotton) by SEMOC (a former parastatal
now being privatized) increased rapidly from 2000 tons in 1988 and peaked at almost 9000
tons in 1994, but the rapid expansion was due almost entirely to the demand for seeds by4 During this period an estimated 1.2 million families received seeds and tools programs annually
(World Bank 1996)
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government and NGOs for distribution through emergency programs.
4  In the early 1990s,
SEMOC’s seed sales for emergency programs represented over 90% of its total business
(Strachan 1994).
When the emergency programs began to wind down in the mid-1990s, demand for formal
sector seed fell sharply.  National production fell to just over 5000 tons in 1995, far below
the installed processing capacity of 18,000 tons/year.  Because the distribution of emergency
seeds was carried out through the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture or directly by
NGOs, the commercial infrastructure for the distribution of seeds was almost non-existent by
the mid-1990s.
 
KEY FINDINGS FROM THE DNER/SG PROGRAM
DNER/SG Maize Yields in 1996/97 Far Exceeded the Provincial Means for
Smallholders Using No Purchased Inputs, But Were Lower Than Average Yields
Reported on DNER/SG Plots in 1995/96.  DNER/SG yields in 1996/97 were highly
variable, ranging from .5 - 4.9 tons/ha. The mean yield for the sample was 2.3 tons/ha,
compared to provincial means of .4 - 1.3 tons/ha and DNER/SG yields in the previous season
of 4.6 tons/ha.  Regression analysis indicates that plant density, number of days of labor
input and weather conditions were all significant determinants of maize yield.  Many farmers
also reported abnormally late and intensive rains during 1996/97 that flooded fields, delaying
operations and causing cobs to rot in the field.  In Regions 4 (East/Central Manica Province)
and 7 (Ribaue District, Nampula Province) the late delivery of DNER/SG inputs further
delayed planting.  The mean plant density in the sample (35,659) was much lower than the
density recommended by DNER  (50,000 plants/ha). 
Financial Analysis: Due to the High Cost of Inputs and Low Prices for Maize, Many
DNER/SG Farmers Lost Money from the Investment in Maize Technology.  Farmer
decisions about whether to adopt a technology package will depend not only on the yield
increases achieved but on the profitability of the package. Financial analysis shows the-x-
profitability of the DNER/SG package to farmers in 1996/97 using output and input prices
actually faced by the farmer during that season.  Net income per hectare was calculated for
farmers selling maize in June, December, and midway between July and December.  
During 1996/97, Storing Maize for Several Months Instead of Selling Immediately After
Harvest Dramatically Increased Farmer Gains, Although This May Not Be True Every Year. 
When farmers sold in June, only 36% made a profit.  At the December price, 80% profited;
of those selling midway between July and December, 62% profited.  The proportion of
gainers and losers varied considerably by region and period.  All of the Region 7 (Ribaue
District, Nampula Province) farmers selling in June lost money; 25% turned a profit if they
waited until December to sell.  In Region 4 (East/Central Manica Province), 27% of farmers
made a profit at June prices, while 89% took a profit at December prices.
Net income per hectare per day of family/mutual labor can be compared to the prevailing
wage rate in the study areas to assess the relative attractiveness of the technology under
varying yield and price levels.  Estimated wage rates varied from 6000 meticais/day in Region
10 (Malema District, Nampula Province) to 20,000 mt/day in Region 4 (East/Central Manica
Province).  When maize was sold at June prices, net income per labor day was lower than the
prevailing wage rate in all regions except the top terciles of Region 8 (Monapo/Meconta
Districts, Nampula Province) (17,100 meticais/day) and Region 10 (Malema District, Nampula
Province) (19,200 meticais/day).  
At average July-December prices, returns per family/mutual labor day remained lower than the
prevailing wage rate everywhere except the top terciles of Region 4 (East/Central Manica)
(25,000 meticais/day), Region 8 (Monapo/Meconta, Nampula Province), and the top two
terciles in Region 10-Manica (Western Manica Province) (12,000 - 22,000 meticais/day) and
Region 10-Nampula (Malema District) (7000 - 24,000 meticais/day). 
When farmers sell in December, returns per labor day are still negative for the bottom two
terciles of Region 7 (Ribaue District, Nampula Province) (-9600-to -7200 meticais/day) and
the lowest terciles in Region 4 (East/Central Manica) and Region 8 (Monapo/Meconta,
Nampula Province), but exceed the wage rate elsewhere.  These returns/day range from
20,000 meticais/day in Region 7 (Ribaue, Nampula Province) to 46,000 and 49,000-xi-
meticais/day for the top yield terciles in Region 10-Manica and Region 10-Nampula,
respectively.
Economic Analysis: Farmers in Nampula Province May Be Better Off If They Can
Export Maize to Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya or Elsewhere.  An estimate of the value of
maize production to the Mozambican economy was obtained by valuing maize, fertilizer, and
seed at world market parity prices, and economic profitability was estimated for the
contrasting scenarios of maize deficit and maize surplus in the southern Africa region. 
Maize Deficit in Southern Africa. When southern Africa has a maize deficit, Mozambican
farmers compete with U.S. or other world maize producers to supply the large Maputo
consumer market and other consumers in the region.  Three cases were considered: (a) high
transport costs; (b) low transport costs; and (c) low transport costs, and Nampula Province
farmers export maize to Malawi rather than Maputo.
Even under the assumption of high transport costs, conditions are relatively favorable for
DNER/SG participants in Manica Province (Regions 4, 10-Manica), where intensified maize
production is profitable for two-thirds of farmers.  For farmers in Nampula (Regions 7, 8, 10-
Nampula) who are far from the Maputo market, intensified maize is barely profitable for the
top tercile in Region 10 and unprofitable for all the rest.  With lower transport costs, profits
increase for Manica Province farmers, but the package is still unprofitable for the lower tercile
of farmers.  Reduced transport costs do not help farmers in Region 7 (Ribaue, Nampula
Province), where intensified maize is still unprofitable for all terciles, but seed and fertilizer use
becomes profitable for the top two terciles in the rest of Nampula Province (Regions 8-
Malema, 10-Nampula).  Nampula Province farmers are best off when they can export maize to
Malawi rather than transporting it the much greater distance to Maputo .
Maize Surplus in Southern Africa. When southern Africa has a maize surplus, Mozambican
producers compete with South Africa to supply Maputo.  As a result, farm-level prices are
much lower across the board than in the maize deficit scenario.  Nampula Province farmers
(Regions 7, 8 10-Nampula) are affected much more severely than their counterparts in Manica-xii-
Province (Regions 4, 10-Manica).  In surplus years, Manica Province prices fall by one third
from deficit price levels, but in Nampula Province prices fall by an estimated 50-85%.  When
southern Africa has a maize surplus, farmers in northern Mozambique may be better off
exporting their maize to countries in other regions of Africa.  Weather patterns in Tanzania
and Kenya are different from southern Africa’s and may provide a market for surplus
Mozambican maize (Koester 1986).  Maize production in neighboring Malawi has been
declining for some years, and this country may  be a market for Mozambican maize even when
the region as a whole is in surplus.  If export to international markets is possible, the analysis
indicates that maize intensification will be profitable for the top two yield terciles in Regions 8
(Monapo/Meconta) and 10 (Nampula), although it will still be unprofitable for farmers in
Region 7 (Ribaue).  Export to Malawi would likely be more profitable than to the international
market.
Credit Repayment:  DNER/SG is Setting a Dangerous Precedent by Not Enforcing
Repayment of Input Loans Made to Farmers During 1996/97.  DNER/SG has not started
to collect loan repayments for the 1996/97 season, and farmers may not be expected to pay
back these loans at all.  As of December 1997, less than 20% of farmers had made any
payments on loans from the previous season.  Thus, farmers may now regard the DNER/SG
program as a grant rather than a loan program, a potentially dangerous precedent that can
undermine the development of private sector input supply channels in these areas. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our analysis of the DNER/SG program suggests that there is substantial scope for increasing
farmer yields and agricultural production in Mozambique through the use of inputs such as
improved seed varieties, fertilizer and pesticides.  Sustained adoption of these inputs by
farmers will depend on the successful implementation of policies and programs that increase
the profitability of input use by (1) improving smallholder awareness of the benefits and
correct use of inputs; (2) reducing the cost of inputs and ensuring their timely availability;
and (3) reducing the cost of marketing commodity outputs and developing new markets for
smallholder commodities.-xiii-
Improving Smallholder Awareness of the Benefits and Correct Use of Inputs.  Most
sample farmers were convinced that the use of Manica seed and chemical fertilizer improved
maize yields.  The successful DNER/SG experience in Mozambique (and the DNER/SG
experience in other countries) suggests that it would be useful to replicate this model
elsewhere in the country with maize and other crops.
Since SG resources are limited, other NGOs, JVCs or private sector firms (including
agrochemical and seed firms) could provide support to expanded DNER efforts in this area. 
Several modifications in the way the program is implemented would increase its
effectiveness.  First, the process of identifying candidate crops and areas for intensification
should include a feasibility study to determine (a) the potential yield gains from use of
improved technology and (b) estimates of the farm-level profitability of the input package.  
Second, the database of information from INIA and NGO trials on yield response to fertilizer
and improved seed varieties should be more effectively utilized: fine-tuning seed and
fertilizer recommendations to match the diversity of agroclimatic conditions found in the
country can increase yields and reduce costs of improved technology.  The addition of
complementary technologies, e.g., storage pesticides and herbicides, may increase the farm-
level profitability of the package.  Storage pesticide would be especially important, allowing
farmers to take advantage of potential seasonal price rises without the risk of losing a large
proportion of their stored grain to insect pests.  Herbicide would help address the weeding
labor constraint, which becomes even more binding when fertilizer is used. Third, greater
attention should be given to training extension agents and making sure they are providing
adequate technical advice to farmers on appropriate planting, fertilization and weeding
methods/timing.
Investments to Reduce Costs and Ensure Timely Availability of Inputs.  In Mozambique
the cost of inputs is very high compared to output prices currently faced by farmers.  Using
June prices, the ratio of the cost of the total input package to the price of one kilogram of
maize ranges from 1,504 in Region 8 (Monapo/Meconta, Nampula Province) to 2,074 in
Regions 4 and 10 in Manica Province.  This means that farmers must produce between 1,504
and 2,074 kilograms of maize to pay for the package of inputs used on one hectare.  Using5 Using the maize price when exporting to Malawi and assuming low transport costs.
6 Using the lowest maize price -- selling in Maputo in a surplus year -- and the highest input cost.
7 Transport and handling costs between the port and farmgate add 31-64% to the import parity price
of fertilizer for farmers in Nampula and Manica Provinces.
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prices from our economic analysis, we calculated ratios in Nampula that ranged from 717
5 to
3,165
6.  In Manica, the economic ratios ranged from a low of 700 to a high of only 873. 
These economic ratios are similar to the financial ratios faced by Ethiopian farmers in
1996/97, who only needed to produce 748 kilograms of maize to pay for a similar package of
inputs (using comparable prices immediately after harvest).  Not coincidentally, the SG
package was highly profitable for nearly all Ethiopian SG participants.  
This analysis suggests that if the export market is developed, especially to Malawi, Nampula 
farmers can expect to face ratios of around 1,000 or lower.  This means that they will begin
to make money with yields of 1 ton per hectare.  With yields of 3 tons and more attainable on
smallholder fields with this technology, the potential profits to farmers become extremely
attractive.
Per-ton seed prices are comparable or lower than those in neighboring countries, but seed is
expensive for Mozambican farmers relative to the output prices they receive.  The average
ratio of OPV seed to grain price is 4.5 in sub-Saharan Africa and 5.4 in southern Africa,
compared to 7.1 in Mozambique (CIMMYT 1994).  Late delivery of inputs was a problem
for many of the DNER/SG participants and is also a concern of smallholder contract farmers
working with JVCs and other large cotton firms.  Major factors affecting input costs and
delivery are the poor state of transportation infrastructure
7, the lack of wholesale and retail
outlets for inputs in the rural areas, and weak demand for fertilizer and seed by smallholders.
Input dealers cannot deal in large enough quantities to realize significant economies of scale.  
A four-part approach is recommended to reduce the cost of getting inputs to smallholders: (1)
improving the transportation infrastructure; (2) reorienting the KRII program to give greater
flexibility and control to private participants; (3) broadening the role of farmer associations
in input distribution and encouraging private agribusiness to expand the wholesale and retail-xv-
network for inputs; and (4) promoting the diversification of the seed subsector, especially
more informal seed replication and distribution.
Improving Transport Infrastructure.  The Mozambican government and donors are well
aware of the need to improve transport infrastructure: the Roads and Coastal Shipping
Project II (ROCs II) represents an important step in improving conditions.  Roughly half of
Mozambique’s estimated 43,000 kms of paved, earth/gravel, and feeder roads are scheduled
for rehabilitation by the year 2000.  Additional investments will be required to upgrade the
remaining portions of the network and maintain improved road surfaces.
Reorienting the Japanese KRII Program. The KRII program provides an important source of
credit, but the current system of centralized ordering and distribution of KRII inputs is
retarding the development of the private input procurement and distribution system in
Mozambique.  We propose that the centralized ordering and distribution system for KRII
inputs be abandoned and that the KRII program become mainly a financing mechanism to
enable private firms and farmer associations to order the quantities and types of agrochemicals
they need, and pay back the amount over time.  Using the KRII funds as a source of credit,
but leaving the process of aggregating orders, tendering for bids, and arranging for
importation in the hands of the Mozambican private sector would reduce costs through
economies of scale and the long time lag between order and receipt of KRII goods.  If it is not
possible to reconfigure KRII in this way, the program should be eliminated.
Broadening the Role of Farmer Associations in Input Distribution and Facilitating the
Development of Private Input Marketing Channels  
Strengthen Farmer Associations.  Building smallholder demand for improved inputs while
simultaneously creating a network of wholesale and retail input suppliers will be a long-term
process. Government and donor funds could be used to strengthen the capacity of smallholder
associations to reduce the cost of input procurement and delivery by aggregating input orders,
guaranteeing payment, and repackaging bulk orders for delivery to individual customers.  One
innovative experiment with farmer associations has had good results and should be studied
more closely to determine how the model could be expanded to other areas in a cost-effective-xvi-
way.  In 1996/97 the Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA) began working with groups
of farmers producing cotton for 3 JVCs operating in northern Mozambique.  The farmers had
been unhappy with the late delivery and quality of inputs delivered by the company.  Under
new agreements negotiated by 18 associations supported by CLUSA, companies agreed to
channel their input supply and extension services, which had traditionally been supplied to
individuals, through associations instead.  This strategy reduced the cost to JVCs of service
provision and improved the timeliness of input delivery.   
If supplier credit is made available through a redesigned KRII and other donor programs,
Mozambican agrochemical firms might similarly work through farmer associations to
aggregate orders and make inputs available locally on a cash basis.  In the future, the
DNER/SG program could work with CLUSA and farmer associations as well as individual
stockists to organize input procurement, delivery and guarantee payment of credit.  
Reduce Barriers to Market Entry.  Policy changes have made it easier to import and sell
inputs, but several administrative barriers to market entry remain.  Retail licenses must be
approved by provincial governors and are difficult and time-consuming to obtain, for
example.  Lack of credit is widely perceived to be a major constraint to the development of
input markets.  However, the severity of the problem is not well understood, and the
discouraging experience with scaled-up credit programs in many SSA countries calls for
careful examination of alternative approaches to increasing credit availability.  
Discontinue Direct Distribution of Inputs by Government and NGOs. The Mozambican
government and NGOs can encourage the development of input markets by discontinuing the
direct distribution of relief or otherwise subsidized fertilizer and seed for commodities that
are available commercially, instead providing farmers with vouchers to purchase inputs from
local sources. 
Provide Technical Training for Stockists.  Another important constraint is the lack of trained
personnel in rural areas who are capable of handling products safely, giving competent
advice about their utilization, and bookkeeping.  Innovative NGO programs such as Citizens
Network are helping to train shopkeepers in Manica Province in collaboration with SG.  In-xvii-
Zimbabwe, CARE’s AGENT program also provides (in addition to technical training in
input use, storage and bookkeeping) credit guarantees until the stockists graduate to regular
supplier lines of credit after 6-8 months in the program.
Diversification of the Seed Sector  
Mozambican farmers in selected agroecological areas are becoming aware of the value of
hybrid maize seed, and this market may expand over the coming years.  For the foreseeable
future, however, the bulk of demand will be for open-pollinated seed that can be replanted
for several seasons, not renewed every year.  This suggests that the development path for
SEMOC will need to differ from counterpart formal seed organizations in neighboring
countries that have relied heavily on centrally grown, centrally processed hybrid maize as a
flagship product.  
Because of its research and varietal testing capability for a wide range of crops and links with
external public and private seed organizations SEMOC, (together with INIA, DNER and the
public seed organizations) can play a unique role in the development of a multi-tiered seed
sector in Mozambique that can better serve the needs of smallholders.  Though some
activities of the seed system can be supported by commercial firms, others will require
support from the government and/or donors.  Examples follow.
Decentralize Seed Production and Marketing.  First, SEMOC and other potential entrants to
the seed market can reduce their costs by decentralizing seed production and marketing.  This
will require joint efforts by companies, public agencies and NGOs to (a) provide links to
NARS, international research centers and other private sector firms to get information and
seed of appropriate varieties; (b) train extension agents to choose appropriate varieties for
different agroecological zones and types of clients; (c) train and supervise farmers in seed
production, selection, storage and marketing; and (d) provide technical training to rural
stockists. 
Review Seed System Regulations and Functions.  Seed subsector regulations need to be
rationalized to encourage the development of the informal seed sector. We recommend a-xviii-
two-tier seed multiplication and distribution system.  At the first level, foundation seed
would be multiplied to certified seed under the stringent and highly controlled conditions
currently required by seed authorities and made available for direct sale.  In the second stage,
seed from the first level would be bulked by individual farmers and farmer groups in local
villages under inspection by extension workers and marketed as standard seed.  
Removing compulsory seed certification and restrictive trade licensing requirements will
permit formal production of quality open-pollinated maize and other crops by smallholders
and sale among neighboring farmers.  In addition, seed companies will be able to involve
smallholders in contract seed production more easily.  
Reducing the Cost of Marketing Commodity Outputs and Developing New Markets for 
Smallholder Commodities.  Increasing the demand for improved inputs by smallholders
ultimately depends on expanding the post-harvest market for commodities produced by
smallholders.  It will be especially important to develop foreign markets for Mozambican
commodities.  Any strategy to develop regional export potential in food and other crops in
northern Mozambique must be active on many fronts.  Critical needs include continued
improvement of port management and roads, especially secondary and tertiary routes; 
simplification of licensing and other bureaucratic procedures related to trade; improved
access to credit for agricultural trade; and continued development of farmer associations.  In
addition, the government can facilitate regional trade in three ways.
Making a Clear Policy Statement that the Government will not Prohibit Maize Exports Even
During Drought Years.  If traders expect that government will close off profit opportunities
during years of regional deficit, they will not invest in their capacity to efficiently and
regularly assemble and export large quantities of grain.  The result will be continued small-
scale operations, high costs, low prices to farmers, and high prices for consumers.
Collaborating with the Private Sector to Create a Regional Trade Information Network.  An
effort is currently underway in MICTUR and should be strengthened.  It will be especially
important to coordinate this effort with the existing market information system (SIMA) in the-xix-
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.  If successful, such a network could eventually provide
the basis for an agricultural commodity exchange in the area.
Removing Bureaucratic Barriers to the Formalization of Farmer Associations so They Can
Continue to Expand Their Marketing Activities.  Strengthened farmer associations can play a
key role in reducing the costs of marketing commodity outputs both domestically and
internationally.  During the 1995/96 season, CLUSA helped farmer associations working in
JVC cotton areas to set up management systems that will enable them to weigh, record and
deliver the cotton to the gins themselves for a higher price.  Farmer groups are also
beginning to coordinate exports.  In 1995/96, 9 CLUSA-assisted associations involving about
3000 farmers in the Ribaue area coordinated to sell 1200 tons of maize to V&M, a South
African company The buyer paid the associations 1000 meticais/kg compared to the market
price of 750 meticais/kg.  Part of the proceeds were invested in the association’s
development fund.  JVCs and other large commercial farms can also play a role in seeking
out new markets and contracting smallholders for the production of these commodities.  For
example, several cotton firms interested in encouraging a cotton-maize or cotton-maize-
legume rotation are actively exploring alternative markets for maize and legumes such as
pigeon pea and groundnuts.-xx-
LIST OF ACRONYMS
DNER  Direcção Nacional de Extensão Rural
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Mozambique, at peace since 1992 after three decades of civil strife, must increase
agricultural production in order to feed its rapidly growing population and promote economic
growth. Intensification (increasing yields on land already under cultivation through the use of
inputs such as chemical fertilizer, improved varieties of seed, and pesticides) is an important
part of this strategy.  The country’s prime agricultural lands are already densely populated,
and the presence of tsetse fly in the productive northern areas makes area expansion through
the use of animal traction difficult.  Programs aimed at increasing agricultural production
will revolve around smallholders, who make up 75% of Mozambique’s population and farm
95% of the land.
Current yields of major food and export crops in Mozambique are low compared to other
African countries.  Smallholder maize yields range from 0.3-1.3 ton/ha, while the average in
Zimbabwe is 1.4 tons/ha and in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) overall is 1.2 tons/ha. Yields in
Mozambique for sorghum, rice, beans, and cotton are also on the very low end of regional
and SSA averages.  The use of improved inputs is extremely limited.  During 1991-95,
Mozambique used 1.84 kg of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium (NPK) per hectare of
arable land annually, compared to 16.55 kg/ha in Southern Africa
8, 8.89 kg/ha in SSA
overall, 54 kg/ha in Latin America, and 80.3 kg/ha in Southern Asia (Naseem and Kelly
1998).  Although many smallholders received improved varieties of seed through emergency
programs during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the programs have now ended and farmers
are recycling instead of purchasing new seed (Domínguez and Chidiamassamba 1997).  
1.1. Objectives and Methods
This report addresses the following research questions: (1) what are current smallholder
yields for major food and cash crops, and what is the potential for increasing yields through
the use of improved technologies?  (2) to what extent are improved technologies already2
being used by smallholders, and is the use of improved technologies profitable?  (3) how are
improved seeds, fertilizer and pesticides currently produced and distributed? and (4) what are
the key constraints and opportunities for increasing the use of improved technologies by
smallholders?
A two-part approach was used to gather data. First, key informants and reports from
government agencies, NGOs, donors and international organizations were consulted to obtain
information on yields, levels of technology adoption, and production and distribution
channels for seed, fertilizer and pesticides.  Second, an in-depth analysis of one of the
country’s leading efforts to promote intensification was carried out.  A survey of 223
smallholders participating in the Direcção Nacional de Extensão Rural/Sasakawa-Global
2000 program (DNER/SG) was undertaken to evaluate the financial and economic
profitability of the improved maize technology package as applied by farmers in Manica and
Nampula Provinces during the 1996/97 season.  
1.2. Organization of the Report
The report begins with a brief overview of Mozambique’s agricultural sector (Section 2). 
Section 3 reviews the status of input use in Mozambique and summarizes the evidence on the
potential yield impacts of improved technologies.  The structure and constraints affecting the
seed, fertilizer and pesticide subsectors are analyzed in Section 4.  Section 5 presents results
from the analysis of the DNER/SG program in Manica and Nampula Provinces.  The paper
concludes with a synthesis of key findings from the study and a discussion of alternative
policies and investments to increase the use of improved technology (Section 6).3
2. AGRICULTURE IN MOZAMBIQUE: AN OVERVIEW
2.1. Agroecology and Farming Systems
Agriculture is the backbone of Mozambique’s economy.  The agricultural sector accounts for
40-50% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employs more than 80% of the labor force, and
provides more than 80% of foreign exchange earnings.  The Instituto Nacional de
Investigação Agronómica (INIA) has divided the country into 10 agroecological regions
(Figure 1).  Regions 1,2, and 3 in southern Mozambique receive 400-800 mm of rainfall
annually and are subject to prolonged periods of drought.  Rainfall is higher (1000-1500 mm)
and more dependable in regions north of the Save River (Regions 4-10).  Soils are of average
quality overall, with better soils found in the plateau and highland areas of northern and
western Mozambique.  Table 1 shows the distribution of cultivated area by crop and province. 
Maize, cassava, beans, cashew and sorghum are the most important crops in terms of area
(DEA 1998).  
The best areas for intensive and diversified agriculture are in northern Mozambique, in parts of
Niassa, Nampula, Manica and Zambezia Provinces with good soils and adequate rainfall. 
Maize, cassava, beans, cashew, sorghum and cotton are the main crops in these areas.  Parts
of Zambezia, Sofala, Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado Provinces are suited to intensive and
semi-intensive agriculture and can support a wide range of rainfed crops.  Most of southern
Mozambique (Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane Provinces) is suited to extensive and semi-extensive
agriculture (World Bank 1996).
 
2.2. Agricultural Sector Development
2.2.1. Colonial Period
During the colonial period Portuguese investments in Mozambique were aimed at increasing
the supply of agricultural raw materials such as cashew, copra, cotton, and tea to Portugal. 
The agricultural sector had three components: large plantations, medium-sized settler farms,
and small African family farms.  Africans were forced to work on Portuguese plantations and4
farms initially as slaves and, after slavery was abolished in 1869, in order to pay taxes levied
by public authorities.  An estimated 100,000 adult rural males migrated to South Africa
annually to work in the mines (World Bank 1996, Tesfai 1991).
Portuguese immigration to Mozambique was encouraged (the Portuguese population rose
from 27,000 to 200,000 between 1940-74) and the economy grew dependent on a Portuguese
labor force for all but the most basic tasks (World Bank 1996).  Africans were not given
access to basic education except through a few mission schools.  The mass departure of
Portuguese shortly before independence (1975) left a critical shortage of skilled labor and
greatly disrupted the rural agricultural sector since the commercial network of Portuguese and
Asian merchants had provided consumer goods, agricultural inputs, and marketing services for
commodity outputs. Between 1973-75 the marketed output of agricultural crops declined by
43% (World Bank 1996, Tesfai 1991).
2.2.2. Independence
Following independence in 1975 the new socialist government took over more than 2000
abandoned Portuguese properties and established large centralized state farms. Between 1978-
82, 90% of government investment in agriculture was allocated to the new state farm sector,
much of it used to purchase machinery (including 3000 tractors and 300 combines), fertilizers
and pesticides. These expenditures were supported in part by a large agricultural development
program funded by the Nordic countries, the Mozambique Nordic Agricultural Program
(MONAP), which operated from 1977-90 (Tesfai 1991). 
At the same time, parastatal monopolies were established to take over marketing and trade
functions formerly managed by Portuguese and Asian traders.  In 1981 the marketing of all
crops, except for cashew and cotton, and the distribution of goods to rural areas was
consolidated under Agricom, a state enterprise based in the Ministry of Internal Commerce. 
Private traders were still allowed to operate and were granted monopoly rights in
geographically defined areas, but the government retained a monopoly at the wholesale level
and regulated marketing margins (World Bank 1996).5
Figure 1.  Agroecological Regions6
Province
Area cult.
(‘000 ha) Cassava  Sorghum  Maize Rice Beans Millet
Sweet
potato Sesame Sunflower Cotton  Cashew Tobacco 
                       --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------percent of total cultivated area------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cabo Del. 451 18.3 17.4 33.7 7.6 6.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 2.4 13.5 0.0
Nampula 892 32.4 8.2 19.5 3.3 13.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 4.7 17.4 0.4
Niassa 260 4.2 17.4 48.6 2 16.3 0.5 2.2 0.3 0.1 1.3 5.4 1.7
Zambezia 799 25 6.0 24 16.7 20.2 .8 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.6 4.4 0.0
Tete 289 0.0 19.8 64.1 0.5 5.7 6.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.2 0.0
Manica 175 0.3 20.2 58.2 0.3 7.1 5.9 2.6 0.9 0.5 0.4 3.5 0.0
Sofala 356 3.9 25.4 42.3 8.0 7.3 5.6 2.2 0.6 0.1 1.1 3.6 0.0
Inhambane 879 15.7 8.5 35.2 1.4 18.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 19.5 0.1
Gaza 356 13.9 1.9 46.4 1.2 22.2 1.7 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 11.3 0.0
Maputo 237 13.1 0.1 51.5 0.4 16.9 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.6 0.0
TOTAL 4,696 17.5 10.9 35.7 5.3 14.6 1.5 1.3 0.2 0.1 1.4 11.3 0.2
Source: DEA 1998
Table 1. Area Under Cultivation (ha) and Percentage of Cultivated Area Planted to Specific Crops, 1996 9The war was waged by RENAMO first with Rhodesian and later South African support.
10By 1990, an estimated 1 million persons had been killed and 5 million were displaced.
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2.2.3. War
Agricultural production partially recovered during the 1978-81 period, although it remained
below colonial-era levels, but the intensification of the guerrilla war
9, poor development
policies, and the severe drought of 1982-83 brought about the near collapse of the
Mozambican economy.  Between 1981 and 1986 GDP and food production fell by an
estimated 30%, marketed production of maize and rice declined by half, and exports declined
by 75%.  The country grew dependent on food aid.  The war also caused a huge displacement
of the population toward the cities
10 and destroyed much of the economic infrastructure.  The
number of private traders fell from 6000 in 1975 to 2000 by 1990 (World Bank 1996).  
2.2.4. Rehabilitation
Since 1987 Mozambique has made substantial progress in improving its macroeconomic
policies -- liberalizing the exchange rate, reducing budget deficits and inflation -- and has
gradually retreated from direct intervention in the economy.  By 1994, 263 small- and
medium-sized public enterprises had been restructured -- either privatized, converted to joint
venture companies (JVCs), or leased.  Most commodity prices (with the exception of cotton)
are now market-determined. The country is making a rapid recovery from decades of poor
development policies and war: an estimated 4.7 million hectares were cultivated in 1996, a
60% increase over 1992 (DEA 1998, World Bank 1996).  Cereals production tripled between
1991 and 1996, rising from .5 to 1.4 million tons (MAP 1997a).  The area and production
increase is due in large part to better rains following the devastating drought of 1991-92, the
expansion of cultivated area by returning refugees and resident farmers, and the reappearance
of markets in rural areas.  
The bi-modal pattern of agricultural production established in the colonial era continues today.
Most smallholders rely on hand hoes; these are supplemented with animal traction in southern
Mozambique.  Joint venture companies (JVCs) and private commercial farms use large
machinery and inputs in combination with labor-intensive weeding and harvesting by farm
workers (World Bank 1996).11 Complete data are available only through the late 1980s, when importation and distribution were
centrally controlled.  Data for 1988/89 onwards represent only KRII program imports of fertilizer and
pesticide, which are estimated to supply almost all of the fertilizer and 1/3-1/2 of pesticide demand.
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3. INPUT USE AND YIELD RESPONSE FROM USE OF IMPROVED INPUTS
3.1. Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
Table 2 shows the quantities of fertilizer and pesticides consumed in Mozambique between
1980 and 1997
11.  During the early 1980s Mozambique used 40,000-80,000 metric tons of
fertilizer and 2-3 million liters/kilograms of pesticide per year, reflecting large investments in
the state farm sector made by the Mozambican government and donors.  Agrochemical use fell
dramatically through the mid-1980s due to the war and collapse of the state farm sector, and
current fertilizer and pesticide consumption is less than 10,000 metric tons and 400,000
liters/kilograms respectively.  
In Mozambique the emphasis in the past has been getting inputs to the large farm sector, not
smallholders, and this remains true today.  Most agrochemicals currently imported are
channeled by the three large JVCs and other smaller cotton and tobacco companies to their
outgrowers.  State sugar and citrus enterprises and large private producers of maize, rice,
vegetables, tea and tobacco consume smaller amounts.  Only an estimated 7% of
smallholders use purchased inputs (Strachan 1994).  Most fertilizer is used in the central and
northern areas of the country, although it is increasingly being used in southern Mozambique
in peri-urban agriculture (fruits and vegetables) and in the irrigated areas (Bay and de Sousa
1990, Pantazis 1997).
3.2. Potential Yield Gains Through Fertilizer Use
3.2.1. Soil Fertility
The level of soil fertility determines how many years land can be cultivated and the quantities
of nutrients needed to maintain yield levels.  Fertility varies by soil type: the most fertile soils
are the Fluvisols, found in valleys that flood regularly.  Lixisols, Luvisols, Ferralsols and12 The value-cost ratio (VCR) is an indicator of financial viability that shows whether the value of the
extra yield obtained through fertilizer use exceeds the cost of the fertilizer treatment.  In the literature it is
conventional to note that VCRs greater than or equal to 2 indicate that fertilizer application is profitable.  This
means that the increase in yield attributable to fertilizer must have a value of at least double the cost of the
fertilizer used for farmers to consider it profitable.  
9
Acrisols maintain reasonable yields for 5-10 years, Arenolsols for only 1-3 years (Mazuze and
Geurts 1997).  Organic fertilizers such as animal manure and crop residues are important for
small areas (such as intensive vegetable cultivation) and in areas where the use of chemical
fertilizers is not financially viable, but are not adequate to replace nutrient losses at the
national level.  If all of the available manure in Mozambique were applied to the total
cultivated area, each hectare would receive only 3.1 kg N, 0.1 kg P, and 2.6 kg K.  The
estimated nutrient deficit per hectare is 21 kg N, 6 kg P, and 15 kg K, however (Stoorvogel
and Smaling 1990, cited in Geurts 1997).
3.2.2. Fertilizer Response 
Over 800 trials to measure soil fertility and response to nutrients were carried out between
1937 and 1991 by researchers from INIA, the Faculty of Agronomy of the Eduardo Mondlane
University, and foreign scientists.  INIA’s Soil and Water Department recently compiled the
results from these trials in a national database.  This database was used to calculate fertilizer
recommendations for the ten most important food crops and cotton, by soil type, water
source, altitude, precipitation, and season.  Key results are shown in Table 14, Appendix 1,
including estimates of without-fertilizer yields, response to N and P, and a value/cost ratio
(VCR)
12 for each recommendation, using fertilizer and market prices from 1992/93 (Geurts
1997). 
In general, the results show a good response to N and P across a number of food crops and
cotton (Table 14, Appendix 1).  Average fertilizer response (% change in yield) was over 50%
in cotton, potato, maize, soybean and wheat.  Geurts also concludes that the use of fertilizer is
profitable for many food crops and cotton, depending on agroecological conditions.  All of the
cotton VCRs were above 1, and most maize, groundnut, rice, potato, sorghum, soybean and
wheat VCRs were well over 2.  Areas of Nampula and Cabo Delgado Provinces and parts of



















1980/81 2,603,893 40,566 16,200 10,000 1,400
1981/82 2,705,298 84,094 20,100 15,000 6,300
1982/83 1,753,224 58,198 20,000 12,800 7,100
1983/84 1,103,048 22,471 7,500 4,300 2,900
1984/85 497,788 10,436 1,692 1,743 465
1985/86 528,406 10,295 1,686 1,471 646
1986/87 1,205,085 13,566 2,000 2,500 1,400
1987/88 451,132 9,610 3,000 2,500 1,000
1988/89 na 3,478 1,100 300 200
1989/90 na 6,500 1,700 300 400
1990/91 na 2,350 2,200 200 200
1991/92 518,440 9,950 2,100 1,700 1,300
1992/93 373,300 2,889 3,000 1,200 700
1993/94 264,975 13,177 2,000 200 1,000
1994/95 211,800 9,805 5,000 1,000 1,000
1995/96 390,500 9,800 5,000 1,000 3,000
1996/97 384,270 1,800 na na na
na: not available.  
Note:  1988/89-1996/97 data reflect only fertilizer and pesticides imported through the Japanese KRII
program. and do not include agrochemicals imported directly by private companies.  
Sources: Imports 1980/81-1990/91 MINAG-DEA 1994;1991/92-1996/97 JICA;N, P consumption–FAO 1998
and Guerts 1997
Table 2. Fertilizer and Pesticide Utilization
cultivation.  Nampula and Cabo Delgado Provinces and higher-elevation areas of Manica,
Zambezia and Tete are best suited to maize production (Mazuze and Geurts 1997). While the
fertilizer response results are encouraging, the profitability estimates should be viewed with
caution for two reasons.  First, most of the data used in the analysis were from trials
conducted under controlled on-station conditions.  Actual farmer yields and responses would
typically be lower.  Second, the fertilizer and crop prices used in the VCR analysis were not
adjusted for transportation costs.  Because Mozambique’s infrastructure is extremely poor,13 In Mozambique there have been relatively few trials measuring the effect of potassium fertilizer,
but in the examples that do exist only rarely was there a statistically significant response.  In general a level of
potassium greater than .2 mg/100 grams soil is considered to be adequate (Sanchez 1978 cited in Geurts 1997). 
Soil tests indicate that the level of potassium in Mozambique soil types ranges from .26 (Arenosols) to .98 mg
(Acrisols) per 100 grams of soil, well above the required minimum. 
11
these costs are high and can significantly affect profitability, as the analysis of farm-level
returns in the DNER/SG program demonstrates (Section 5).  
An alternative measure of response (useful when prices are not known) is the ratio of output
response to total kilograms of nutrient.  An output/nutrient ratio of 10 is considered favorable
for cereals (Yanggen, Kelly, Reardon, and Naseem 1998).  The output/nutrient ratios for rice,
sorghum and maize in Mozambique exceed 10 under many conditions.  Results for wheat are
mixed.  Sorghum and maize had the highest ratios, reaching 50 for maize in Luvisols, and over
20 for sorghum in Luvisols and for maize in Acrisols, Ferralsols and Lixisols (Table 14,
Appendix 1). 
The results show that fertilizer recommendations and response vary widely even for the same
crop, depending on the agroecological zone and soil type.  This implies that recommendations
should be fine-tuned to the soil type and agroecological zone if farmers are to maximize
financial benefits.  For example, for the soil types found in the DNER/SG study areas in
Manica and Nampula Provinces, N recommendations for maize ranged from 30-100 kg/ha and
recommended P
 ranged from 0 to 60 kg/ha.  The actual amounts of N and P applied on
DNER/SG plots were 58 and 24 kg/ha in all cases, usually a much lower rate than
recommended.  An additional 12 kilograms per hectare of potassium was applied on the
DNER/SG plots, although this was not recommended for any of the crop/soil/agroecological
zone combinations.
13 
3.2.3. On-farm Fertilizer Trial Results
World Vision International (WVI) in collaboration with INIA carried out a set of researcher-
controlled experiments in 1993/94, 1994/95, and 1995/96 to examine the effects of different
combinations of N and P applied to the Manica maize variety.  The experiments were14 In 1993/94, yields of WVI/INIA trials ranged from 3.37 mt/ha (0N 0P) to 4.36 mt/ha (100N 100P)
at Morrua, Zambezia Province; .88 mt/ha (0N 0P) to 1.49 mt/ha (100N 100P) at Furandungo (Tete), 1.47
mt/ha (0N 0P) to 2.05 mt/ha (100N 100P) at Nampula and 1.5 mt/ha (0N 0P) to 1.95 mt/ha (100N 100P) at
Namapa (Nampula).  Soils in these areas are predominantly Lixisols and Luvisols.  Maize yields with and
without fertilizer reported in Geurts 1997 for Lixisols were 1.3 mt/ha (0N 0P) to 1.8 mt/ha (80N 40P), 1.4
mt/ha (0N 0P) - 3.1 mt/ha (80N 60P), 1.5 mt/ha (0N 0P) - 2.5 mt/ha (50N 20P), 1.8 mt/ha (0N 0P) - 3.6 mt/ha
(30N 50P), and 2.2 mt/ha (0N 0P) to 4.2 mt/ha (90N 30P).  Results for Luvisols were 1.5 mt/ha (0N 0P) - 4.0
mt/ha (50N) and 5.7 mt/ha (80N 40P) - 6.4 mt/ha (80N 40P).
15 Surveys undertaken by World Vision International in Zambezia Province indicate that the most
popular crop varieties included finger millet (100% of recipients saved seed for resowing), sweet potato
(81.1%), rice (69.2%), mung bean (66.7%), maize (66.4%), sunflower (61.5%), and cowpea (58.6%).  Most
distributed varieties combined high yield with earliness and an acceptable taste.  Less popular were distributed 
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conducted at locations in Zambezia, Tete, and Nampula Provinces.  The trial results generally
confirm the results of the Geurts study, although fertilizer response and yields were lower, and
there was considerable variation in yields across locations and years.
14  Fertilizer rates ranged
from 0 to 100 N 100 P. The most significant responses came from N and P applied together at
the rate of 50N and 50P.  Increasing the rate to 100P raised yields in some sites but not
significantly.  Average fertilizer response in the WVI/INIA trials was 42% in 1993/94 and
1994/95 and 54% in 1995/96, compared to over 100% for the trials reported in Geurts (1997)
on similar soils.  No significant impact was obtained from adding potassium (WVI).
3.3. Use of Improved Seed Varieties
Use of improved varieties of seed differs by farmer category and crop type.  Commercial
farmers producing maize and vegetables and some smallholder vegetable producers purchase
improved varieties annually through formal channels such as Sementes de Moçambique
Limitada (SEMOC), the Zimbabwe Seed Coop, and South African seed companies
(Dominguez and Chidiamassamba 1997).  Substantial quantities of improved seed for staple
food crops such as maize, beans, and cowpea were provided to Mozambican smallholders
through an emergency distribution program, Programa de Emergência de Sementes e
Utensílios (PESU) during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Table 3).  These distributions met
more than half of the estimated annual seed demand of 18,600 tons for principal food crops in
a normal year (Bay and de Sousa 1990).  PESU has now ended and up to 80% of the seed
used by smallholders is saved from year to year (Dominguez and Chidiamassamba 1997).  A
large part of the saved seed is descended from improved varieties,











Table 3. PESU Distributions of Seed, All Crops, 1987-92
to deteriorate over time if it is not replaced, outcrossing (depending on the reproduction type)
with varieties in neighboring fields and/or becoming more vulnerable to disease.
The cotton companies are required to provide smallholders with cotton seed free of charge as
part of their land concession agreement with the government.  Seeds are separated from the
cotton fiber during the ginning process, then treated, stored and distributed to farmers before
the planting season.  Most of these cotton varieties have been circulating in Mozambique for a
long time, and research activities are underway to identify new varieties with higher ginning
outturn ratios and insect resistance.  Improved varieties of cashew have been multiplied and
distributed to smallholders in northern Mozambique over the past several years as part of
donor-funded programs to rehabilitate the subsector.    
3.4. Potential Yield Gains Through the Use of Improved Seed Varieties
Seed variety research and development is carried out principally by INIA, the Faculty of
Agronomy of Eduardo Mondlane University, and SEMOC.  Several NGOs, including WVI
and Food for the Hungry International (FHI), have also conducted variety trials and
distributed improved seed as part of post-war rehabilitation efforts.  Table 4 summarizes the
available evidence on average and potential yields of major crops under research station
conditions using improved seed varieties, fertilizer and improved husbandry practices. These
results suggest that the use of improved technologies could increase the yields of major crops16 The national list of approved maize varieties is presented in Table 15, Appendix 1.
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Crop Average yield (mt/ha) Potential yield (mt/ha) % change in yield
Maize 0.4 - 1.3 5 - 6.5 576
Sorghum .3 - .6 .8 - 2 211
Rice 0.5 -1.8 2.5 - 6 270
Beans 0.3 - 0.6 0.5 - 2.5 233
Cassava 4 - 5 5 - 10 67
Cotton 0.3 - 0.6 1.2 167
Cashew 0.1 - 0.2 6 390
Sources: MAP 1997b; World Bank 1996; personal communication, March 1996, Dr. M.V.R. Prasad (African
Development Bank Cashew Rehabilitation Project)
Table 4. Average and Potential Yields of Major Crops
by 67 - 576%. Yields are typically much lower when improved technology is managed by
farmers, however.  For example, although the yield potential of improved varieties of maize
with fertilizer can exceed 6 tons on research stations, on-farm trials using the same technology
achieved yields between 1.5 - 4 mt/ha (WVI). A number of Mozambican and imported
varieties of maize, cowpea, rice, soybean, bean, groundnut, sorghum, sunflower and wheat
have been evaluated by INIA and the National Seed Service and are included in the official list
of varieties approved for sale.
16  
3.4.1. Improved Maize Varieties
Improved seed can take two forms, open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) and hybrids.  OPVs
generate less quickly than hybrids, which must be replaced annually to maintain high yield
levels.  In most cases hybrids outyield OPVs and tend to be more responsive to fertilizer, but
seed production is costly and technically demanding.  Large seed companies tend to promote
the use of hybrid seed because it must be purchased annually, but it may be too expensive for
small farmers to use for less commercialized crops (Rusike, Howard and Maredia 1997). 15
Elsewhere in southern Africa major yield gains have been achieved through the introduction of
hybrid maize seed to smallholders.  In Zimbabwe and Zambia the introduction of SR-52 and
newer hybrids increased yields by 45-164% over local varieties during the 1980s (Rohrbach
1988, Howard 1994).  The emphasis on hybrids in these countries was justified in part by the
existence of (1) a large group of commercial maize seed growers who could carry out the
technically demanding tasks associated with hybrid maize seed production; and (2) a state-
subsidized marketing and credit system for input distribution that made hybrid maize seeds and
fertilizer available to smallholders at the local level. 
In Mozambique the focus has instead been the development and dissemination of improved
open-pollinated varieties of maize that in general have a lower yield potential but can be
replanted for several seasons with little deterioration of varietal characteristics.  There are
fewer improved maize varieties suited to Mozambican conditions compared to other countries
in southern Africa.  This is partly due to the relative youth of the breeding program in
Mozambique, but also because much of the past breeding work in the region focused on the
development of improved varieties and hybrids for cooler mid-altitude conditions
(encompassing the predominant maize-growing areas of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and
Malawi).  The high-yielding hybrids developed for Zimbabwe and Zambia perform best at
altitudes ranging from 900-1300 meters above sea level, for example.  Some agroecological
regions in Mozambique lie above 800 meters, e.g., parts of Zone 4 (Manica Province) and
Zone 10 (Manica and Nampula Provinces), and farmers there are beginning to plant
Zimbabwean and Malawian hybrids, but the majority of Mozambique’s maize-growing area
lies in the hotter lower altitudes.  
Matuba and Manica SR (streak-resistant) are the principal maize varieties recommended by
INIA Both varieties were improved by and are produced and sold through SEMOC.  Both are
open-pollinated:  Matuba has a relatively short growing season (100-120 days); Manica’s is
longer (130-150 days), and both are rated favorably by farmers in terms of taste and milling
characteristics.  These varieties do well in central and southern Mozambique, but are less well
suited to northern Mozambique, which normally has a longer growing season.  Obregon (150
days) is recommended for higher altitude areas in northern Mozambique but has not been16
widely adopted.  SEMOC 1 (115-130 days) and Umbeluzi (120-140 days) are additional
Mozambican varieties that were distributed as part of PESU relief packages.  The DNER/SG
program distributed Manica during the 1995/96 and 1996/97 seasons, but used SEMOC 1 in
1997/98 instead, in part a shortened maize growing season was expected as a result of the El
Niño phenomenon.  More recently SEMOC has released 6 hybrids of varying season lengths
for commercial farmers.  R201, a Zimbabwean hybrid, has also performed very well in on-farm
trials of seed and fertilizer conducted by WVI.in Zambezia, Tete and Nampula Provinces,
outyielding Manica and Matuba in all locations (WVI; SEMOC 1993a, 1994a; República de
Moçambique 1995).17 The factory consists of a plant for sulfuric acid with a capacity of 60,000 tons/year, an ammonium
sulfate plant with a capacity of 60,000 tons/year, a superphosphate plant with a capacity of 15,000 tons/year,
and a granulated fertilizer plant with a capacity of 20,000 tons/year.
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4. ORGANIZATION OF THE INPUTS SUBSECTOR AND CONSTRAINTS TO
INCREASED INPUT USE
The evidence summarized in the preceding section suggests that there is considerable
potential for improving the yields of major crops through the use of inputs such as improved
seed and fertilizer.  However, the level of input use remains extremely low, especially among
smallholders.  To what extent does the cost and scarcity of inputs at the local level deter their
use by smallholders?  In this section we describe how seed, fertilizer and pesticides are
produced and distributed in Mozambique and explore key constraints and opportunities for
increasing the use of these improved technologies by smallholders.
4.1. Manufacturing, Importation and Distribution of Fertilizer and Pesticide 
4.1.1. Fertilizer and Pesticide Manufacture
A fertilizer manufacturing plant (Empresa Quimica Geral) was established in Matola in 1966
and produced simple superphosphate, ammonium sulfate and other fertilizers from imported
raw materials between 1968-85.  Aging equipment and dwindling demand halted fertilizer
manufacture in the mid 1980s, but the factory continues to custom-blend 500-600 tons of
simple fertilizers annually. The factory’s total capacity is 155,000 tons/year, but average
production from 1968 to 1983 was less than a third of that
17 (Quimica Geral 1996). 
Mozambique has deposits of raw materials (an estimated 114 billion cubic meters of natural
gas at Pande and phosphate rock with 12% phosphate content at Monapo) that provide a
potential source of raw materials for fertilizer manufacture.  The economics of developing
these resources will need to be analyzed in the light of limited domestic demand in the near
future, existing excess fertilizer manufacturing capacity in the region, and the cost of18
rehabilitating the fertilizer plant, estimated at $10-15 million (Bay and de Sousa 1990, Rusike
1997).
Three private companies, EMOP, Shell, and BASF, each own pesticide formulation facilities
in Mozambique.  Their combined total capacity is 7700 tons, but  national pesticide
consumption averaged less than 1000 tons annually in the last decade.  Almost all of this is
met with finished products imported directly by large companies and through donor aid
programs such as KRII.
4.1.2. Fertilizer and Pesticide Import and Distribution
Through the 1980s state agencies and commercial firms placed fertilizer and pesticide import
orders with one of five international firms represented in Maputo.  The parastatal Interquimica
then imported all agrochemicals and Boror Commercial, another parastatal, distributed them
through a network of retail outlets.  Both of these firms have subsequently been privatized and
companies are now free to import agrochemicals.  The closure of Boror Commercial retail
outlets and the scarcity of private retail outlets for agrochemicals outside of Maputo have
severely restricted small and medium-scale farmers’ access to fertilizer and pesticides. 
Farmers must now travel to Maputo or the largest regional centers to buy directly from
Interquimica or representatives of multinational firms, or procure inputs informally from South
Africa and Zimbabwe (Strachan 1994, Bay and de Sousa 1990, Pantazis 1997). 
Following input market liberalization, large agricultural enterprises can obtain agrochemicals
in several ways.  First, they can order through agrochemical companies representing
multinational firms (e.g., Agroquímicos, Tecap, Zeneca). These companies currently supply
pesticides worth an estimated $3-5 million per year, meeting approximately one-third of total
demand.  Second, JVCs and other large commercial enterprises can order pesticides directly,
accounting for another third of total pesticides used.  Third, the Japanese KRII aid program
supplies the rest of national pesticide demand and virtually all of the fertilizer used in
Mozambique.  18 The KRII program has operated in 39 sub-Saharan African countries.  Through 1995 total
disbursements were approximately $1.5 billion (Inaba 1997).
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4.1.3. The KRII Program 
Over the years a number of donors and international organizations, including the European
Union, African Development Bank, USAID and ODA have provided inputs for agriculture. 
The largest such program currently functioning is the Japanese KRII program.
18  Since the
program began operating in Mozambique in 1986 it has provided in-kind grants of pesticides,
fertilizers and agricultural machinery worth approximately $9 million annually, supplying about
half of the total agrochemical needs of the country (Strachan 1994).  In most countries where
KRII operates the agrochemicals are intended to support food production, and these were the
terms under which KRII was approved for Mozambique.  By 1989, however, part of the
pesticide allotment was being used for cotton production (Strachan 1994, Pantazis 1997).  
The KRII program functions as follows: the Mozambican government prepares a list of
requested fertilizers, pesticides and equipment (JICA places few restrictions on agrochemicals
and equipment that may be ordered through the program).  After the Japanese government
approves the request, Interquimica prepares an international tender and arranges importation
of the products through Japanese trading companies.  Pesticides are allocated to specific
recipients at the time the order is placed, but Interquimica resells the fertilizer.  Part of the
equipment imported through the program is designated for government use and the remainder
is resold (Strachan 1994, Pantazis 1997).  
Recipients of KRII agrochemicals are supposed to pay a countervalue of 2/3 FOB for
pesticides and 2/3-100% CIF for fertilizers and equipment into an agricultural development
fund.  The countervalue is payable up to 2 years after the goods are received at an interest rate
that has been well below the commercial rate in most years.  A large part of the countervalue
goes uncollected, however.  For example, in 1991 the Mozambican government decided that
the countervalue would not be collected for pesticides used in smallholder cotton production. 
This represented an estimated 43% of the total KRII program in 1993 and 30% in 1992. 20
Other recipients of KRII inputs have also been exempted or allowed to pay the countervalue
over a long period of time.  While the KRII subsidy is intended for smallholders, there is no
public reporting of these subsidies and no assurance that the cotton companies or other traders
are transmitting the subsidies to their smallholder growers.  Instead the subsidy permits cotton
companies to set a lower producer price for cotton, thus increasing their profits (Strachan
1994, Fok 1995, Pantazis 1997).   
Companies can access KRII agrochemicals in a two different ways.  First, they can directly
request specific products and quantities through the KRII program.  If they do so they are
responsible for paying the countervalue (unless the product is destined for smallholder cotton
production or is otherwise exempt from payment).  Obtaining agrochemicals through KRII is
cheaper than ordering through agrochemical representatives or directly from the international
market, but there are drawbacks.  For example, there is considerable uncertainty about when
the agrochemicals will arrive (it may take up to 18 months between order and delivery). 
Companies may also have to pay large storage fees if the agrochemicals sit at the docks for a
long period.  In practice, a large part of the KRII program imports go unclaimed and are
auctioned off by the Mozambican government after one or two years.  This provides a second,
even cheaper way to get agrochemicals, if users can find what they need.  
As a long-term strategy, depending on the KRII program (or any aid program) is risky since
the program is renewed on a year-to-year-basis by the Japanese government.  Even more
important, while the KRII program provides needed supplier credit, the current system of
centralized ordering and distribution of KRII inputs is retarding the development of the private
input procurement and distribution system in Mozambique. 
4.2. Organization of the Seed Subsector
4.2.1. Formal Seed Production
Since the 1970s, efforts to develop the Mozambican seed subsector have focused on the
establishment of a formal seed industry similar to those in Western countries.  In the late19 The Nordic countries spent over $21 million to develop the seed industry between 1977 and 1990
(Tesfai 1991).
20MAP holds 80% of shares, Svalöf AB (Sweden’s largest seed company) 10% and Swedfund 10%.
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1970s the Mozambican government initiated the National Seed Program with assistance from
FAO and the Scandinavian donors (through MONAP)
19 to support the development of basic
seed by INIA and seed multiplication at regional centers in Chokwe, Chimoio and Nampula. 
Although the project was fully functional by 1980, it was unable to supply all of the country’s
seed requirements.  Between 1982 and 1986 the marketing agency AGRICOM recirculated
2000-5000 metric tons of grain per year as seed to smallholders and private farmers as the war
disrupted traditional seed preservation systems (Tesfai 1991, Strachan 1994). 
In 1980 the government created a parastatal seed company to coordinate seed production in
the country, the Empresa Nacional de Sementes (ENS), and in 1982 established a national
seed service (SNS) within INIA (with bilateral assistance from Denmark) with responsibility
for seed testing and quality control.  In 1989 ENS was transformed into a semi-commercial
seed company, Sementes de Moçambique Limitada (SEMOC).
20  The Swedish International
Development Authority (ASDI) provided extensive foreign assistance, including the payment
of expatriate salaries for technicians and researchers.  The new company produced seed for
rice, maize, groundnut, bean, cowpea, soybean, sorghum, sunflower and some vegetables,
while cotton seed production remained the responsibility of the state.  Production took place
initially on centralized seed farms and, beginning in the early 1990s, with contracted seed
producers.  Processing plants with standardized equipment are located in Maputo, Lionde,
Chimoio and Namialo.  
SEMOC initially planned to concentrate on multiplication and distribution of varieties
developed by INIA, but because INIA had a limited capacity for generating new varieties,
SEMOC began varietal testing and other research activities on its own.  In the short-run the
company was to focus on variety screening of indigenous and introduced material, control of
pre-basic and basic seed and utilization of open-pollinated varieties (OPV) instead of hybrids,
given the low management level on seed farms and the limited capacity of Mozambican
farmers to purchase hybrids each year (Tesfai 1991; Svalöf 1988, 1990; Strachan 1994).    22
Formal seed production (excluding cotton) increased rapidly from 2000 tons in 1988 and
peaked at almost 9000 tons in 1994.  Maize seed made up 70% of total seed production and
64% of total sales (SEMOC 1996). The rapid expansion was due almost entirely to the
demand for seeds from PESU for distribution through emergency programs.  At its height, an
estimated 1.2 million families received seeds and tools through the emergency programs
(World Bank 1996).  In the early 1990s, SEMOC’s seed sales for emergency programs
represented over 90% of its total business (Strachan 1994).  SEMOC marketed the remainder
of the seed commercially through various wholesalers such as Boror Commercial, which
retailed the seed through their own networks.  SEMOC also retailed and sold seed directly to
agricultural projects as well as small amounts to customers through its shop in Maputo.  Since
domestic production was insufficient to meet all emergency needs, SEMOC also became the
leading seed importer as well as producer.  By the mid 1990s, domestically produced seed
constituted 60% of SEMOC’s total sales with the remainder imported (SEMOC 1993b,
1994b; Svalöf 1989).
When the emergency programs began to wind down in the mid-1990s, demand for formal
sector seed fell sharply.  SEMOC sales fell from 14,000 tons in 1993 and 1994 to 9000 tons in
1995. SEMOC’s seed production fell to 5335 tons in 1995, far below the installed processing
capacity of 18,000 tons/year (SEMOC 1995, MAP 1997b).  Because the distribution of
emergency seeds was carried out through the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture or directly
by NGOs, the commercial infrastructure for the distribution of seeds was almost non-existent
in the mid-1990s.  Creating a demand for purchased seed among smallholders has been
difficult after many years of free seed distribution.  To make seeds more accessible to
smallholders, SEMOC began packaging seed in 2 kilogram packages beginning in 1988. 
SEMOC recently expanded its distribution network, opening dedicated stores in several
centers (including Beira, Chokwe, Chimoio and Nampula) in addition to organizing a network
of agents in most districts (F. Chilenge, personal communication, June 1997).  
Per-ton seed prices in Mozambique are comparable or lower than those in neighboring
countries, but seed is expensive for Mozambican farmers relative to the output prices they23
receive.  The average ratio of OPV seed to grain price is 4.5 in sub-Saharan Africa and 5.4 in
southern Africa, compared to 7.1 in Mozambique (CIMMYT 1994).
4.2.2. Informal Channels of Seed Production
Recent seed policies have given more attention to meeting smallholder needs and improving
traditional methods of seed selection and conservation.  The Agricultural Policy and
Implementation Strategy approved in 1995 has four objectives related to seeds, including the
expansion of propagation centers for improved roots and tubers, promotion of local seed
production by farmers, and dissemination of techniques for the storage and conservation of
seeds (Pereira 1997).  
Seed production activities by smallholders were severely disrupted by the war.  Some
observers feared a general loss of genetic variability and deterioration of the capacity to
preserve seed of traditional varieties, but a recent study suggests that indigenous knowledge of
seed selection and conservation remains intact despite the upheavals of the past few years
(MAP 1997b, Domínguez and Chidiamassamba 1997).  
Seed conservation methods vary from region to region.  Storage chemicals are generally not
used.  Farmers store seed in containers close to the house, and depending on the area may
treat the seed with smoke, ashes or tobacco leaves tied to the mouth of containers, which are
then sealed with dried leaves and mud.  Laboratory analyses show that the germination rate for
seed products stored using traditional methods is very high, especially for maize.  Drought and
insect attacks are the principal factors affecting informal seed production and storage.  In
recent years the traditional practice of giving and receiving seeds free of charge has begun to
change.  It is becoming more common for farmers to exchange seeds for other varieties or
crops, or for other products, manual labor or cash (Domínguez and Chidiamassamba 1997).  24
4.3. Improving Incentives for the Private Sector to Serve Small Farmers
4.3.1. Fertilizer and Pesticides 
Agrochemical companies encounter several problems in extending services to smallholders,
including (1) the extremely poor state of transport infrastructure, which reduces the
profitability of input use; (2) difficulty in obtaining credit at the wholesale and retail levels to
procure fertilizers and pesticides, and the lack of farm-level credit programs to help cash-
constrained smallholders purchase inputs over time; (3) smallholders’ lack of knowledge about
improved inputs; (4) the need to train retailers in product application, handling and
bookkeeping practices; and (5) regulations that do not have a clear function and increase the
cost of doing business.
Reducing Transport Costs. The farm-level cost of inputs is high in Mozambique: the analysis
in Section 5 indicates that transport and handling costs between the port and farmgate add 31-
64% to the import parity price of fertilizer.  A key factor is the poor condition of
Mozambique’s transportation infrastructure. Only 30% of roads are in good condition, and
15% are not navigable on a regular basis.  A major initiative by the Mozambican government
and donors, the Roads and Coastal Shipping Project II (ROCs II), represents an important
step in improving conditions: roughly half of Mozambique’s estimated 43,000 kms of paved,
earth/gravel, and feeder roads are scheduled for rehabilitation by the year 2000 (World Bank
1996).  Additional investments will be required to assure that upgraded roads are maintained
and the remaining portions of the network are improved.
Modifications to the KRII Program. The KRII program represents one approach used by the
government and donors to reduce the high cost of inputs at the farm level.  KRII has made an
important contribution by relieving the credit constraint for agrochemical and other private
companies that import fertilizer and pesticides.  However, significant changes in its operation
are needed if KRII is to contribute to building a sustainable input supply system throughout
the country.25
One fundamental problem is the lack of transparency in the way that KRII goods are ordered,
distributed and paid for.  Currently a three-person team of government officials is responsible
for drawing up the list of goods to be submitted to the Japanese government.  Decisions about
quantities and types of products to be ordered do not appear to be based on technical
recommendations or realistic estimates of effective demand for inputs.  As a result, there is a
mismatch between the country’s needs and what gets ordered through the KRII program.  The
process through which KRII goods are distributed after arrival and rules about the payment of
countervalue and other charges are equally unclear.  This has led to speculation about graft
associated with the program.  The uncertainty surrounding the timing and prices (frequently
well below import parity prices) at which large quantities of KRII fertilizer and agrochemicals
will be released on the market makes local agrochemical dealers reluctant to import and
maintain private stocks.  
To address the transparency problem, we propose three modifications in the way that the KRII
program is organized in Mozambique.  First, the committee responsible for ordering KRII
inputs should be broadened to include technical experts from the government and private
sector, representatives of agrochemical companies, and other major users of agrochemicals in
the for- and non-profit private sector.  This committee would be charged with drawing up a
list of goods to be ordered through KRII that reflects the types and quantities of inputs that
are technically correct and for which there is likely to be an effective demand (Pantazis 1997).  
Second, KRII funds should be used as a source of credit, but the bidding and importation
process should be left as much as possible in the hands of the Mozambican private sector. 
This would provide important experience in aggregating orders to realize economies of scale
and decrease costs, and might reduce the long time lag between order and receipt of KRII
goods.  
Third, upon arrival at port, all KRII products should be put up for auction, with the proceeds
deposited in an agricultural development fund to be jointly administered by a panel of
government, JICA and private sector representatives. The panel could openly solicit proposals
from the public and private sectors for activities aimed at increasing smallholder demand for26
purchased inputs or expanding the number of shops selling inputs in rural areas.  Potentially
important activities include the expansion of DNER/SG demonstration plots and technical
assistance to farmer organizations to enable them to estimate input demand, aggregate input
orders and contract directly with agrochemical firms to reduce transport costs and ensure
timely delivery.
Expanding the Network of Rural Input Dealers.  Another important constraint is the lack of
trained personnel in rural areas who are can handle products safely, give competent advice
about agrochemical use, and maintain bookkeeping records.  One innovative NGO program in
Zimbabwe has been training rural stockists for the past several years.  CARE’s AGENT
program works with smallholders to identify trusted village-level stockists, provides them with
technical training and guarantees short-term credit. CARE then aggregates orders from field
agents and tenders them for bid. Orders are filled and delivered by local suppliers.  The
stockists sell the inputs to smallholders on a cash basis only.  After 6-8 months, stockists
graduate from CARE-guaranteed credit to regular supplier lines of credit (M. Mispelaar,
personal communication, March 1997).  DNER/SG in Manica Province recently began
cooperating with the NGO Citizen’s Network to train rural storekeepers in input handling and
distribution.  It will be important to examine the lessons from the AGENT program and
consider incorporating some of the best elements from AGENT into the DNER/SG/Citizen’s
Network effort.  
Eliminating Administrative Barriers. Over the past several years the Mozambican government
has made many changes to facilitate the importation and sale of inputs.  The import duty on
fertilizer has been lowered from 20% to 2.5%, the tax rate on profits has been reduced, and
the circulation tax (a cascading consumption tax) is scheduled to be replaced by VAT in 1998
(Pantazis 1997).  Several administrative barriers to market entry remain, however.  Retail
licenses must be approved by provincial governors and are difficult and time-consuming to
obtain.  Applicants must pay a fee of US$40 and submit a long list of documents, including a
police security check and sometimes a bank account statement showing a specified balance
(World Bank 1996, Pantazis 1997).  While independent importers are now free to bring in
inputs from competing international companies, government regulations currently require27
independent importers to issue an international tender when the imports exceed a certain
amount.  The tendering process increases the cost of doing business, and since importers have
a business incentive to procure from the least expensive sources, the purpose of the regulation
is not clear (Pantazis 1997). 
Credit. Lack of credit is widely perceived to be a major constraint to the development of input
markets at the wholesale, retail and farm levels.  However, the severity of the problem at
different levels is not well understood.  The discouraging experience with scaled-up credit
programs in many sub-Saharan countries should lead to more study of the problem and careful
examination of alternative approaches to increasing credit availability.  Several initiatives have
recently been proposed in Mozambique.  For example, a proposed finance ministry program
(FARE) would provide credit guarantees to support the development of small business in
agriculture and other sectors.  The maximum loan under this initiative is 100 million meticais,




Thanks to relief programs during the late 1980s and 1990s, many smallholders received
improved varieties of seed and continued to plant them in subsequent seasons (WVI 1996). 
However, serious problems have emerged following the phase-out of relief and rehabilitation
schemes.  First, SEMOC grew heavily dependent on the relief schemes as a means to
distribute its products to rural areas.  Now that the schemes have ended, SEMOC faces the
expense of building a network of retail distributors in the rural areas from the ground up. 
Second, farmers grew used to the distribution of free seed and are now reluctant to buy
SEMOC seeds because they perceive the prices to be very high.  As a result, farmers are
planting either deteriorating improved varieties or returning to established but lower yielding
local varieties instead of purchasing seed through the formal sector.    
Though improved varieties of seed are available through INIA and SEMOC, in Mozambique
and other countries in southern Africa adoption by smallholders has been linked to subsidized21 ZAMSEED in Zambia is now being privatized, but began as a parastatal similar to SEMOC with
technical assistance from Svalöf financed by Swedish aid.
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or free distribution of seed (Rusike, Howard and Maredia 1997).  In other countries, too,
support to the seed system has up to now focused on development of the large centralized
seed organizations.  Only recently, as economic reforms eliminate subsidies that sustained
production and distribution of seeds by large parastatals, have countries and donors become
aware of the importance of developing other parts of the seed system (e.g., farm-level seed
production and production by small businesses) in order to increase the flow of higher-yielding
new varieties to smallholders.
It is useful to compare what is happening in Mozambique’s seed sector with recent seed sector
developments in Mozambique’s western neighbors, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  In those countries
a tri-level seed system is emerging, roughly based on the biological and technical production
features of a crop (e.g., reproductive characteristics, sowing rate, multiplication rates, rate of
varietal deterioration) that affect seed profitability.  At the first level, the large centralized
private seed companies (including international firms such as Pioneer and Pannar ) and former
parastatals
21 are specializing in seed sectors with high profit margins and high and regular
annual seed sales such as hybrid maize, sunflower, and hybrid sorghum. These companies have
the financial and technical resources to carry out their own private research and extension
programs.  The research and varieties developed are targeted to high potential areas and to
crops such as maize that have high multiplication rates.  These seed commodities are less
costly to manage because fewer multiplications are required and there are smaller quantities to
process, store, transport and distribute at each stage (Rusike, Howard and Maredia 1997).   
At the second tier, emerging domestic seed companies and commercially-oriented NGOs are
beginning to test varieties, train local seed producers, and develop niche markets for open-
pollinated varieties of maize, sorghum, and groundnut seed, where financial returns to
research and development have been too low to attract the large seed firms.  In the third tier
are NGOs and farmer organizations that undertake village-level varietal screening, seed
production and germplasm conservation on subsistence crops.  Bulky seed crops such as
groundnuts and legumes are more amenable to production by localized seed companies, NGOs29
and farmer associations in tiers 2 and 3 that can minimize transport costs at each stage
(Rusike, Howard and Maredia 1997).
Unlike Zimbabwe and Zambia, SEMOC faces a disadvantage in not having a large group of
commercial farmers in the country who are already using hybrid maize seed.  In other
countries in the region, hybrid maize has served as the flagship seed commodity.  Hybrid maize
represented 70-90% of the total volume of sales and 60% of revenue for Zamseed in the late
1980s (SIDA 1988).  To ensure Zamseed’s viability, Zamseed and its technical advisers at
Svalöf pushed for the development of hybrids, for which new seed would be purchased each
year, rather than open-pollinated varieties whose seed could be saved and replanted as has
been the emphasis at SEMOC (Howard 1994).
The bulk of SEMOC’s seed sales and seed demand in the country are for maize, rice, and
legumes such as cowpea and bean.  SEMOC has developed some maize hybrids and can
continue to develop this market, especially among large commercial farms who grow maize in
rotation with cotton and small and medium farmers in mid-altitude regions who are already
familiar with Zimbabwean and Malawian maize hybrids.  It can also play a role in sourcing
varieties and seeds for specialty crops that commercial farms are interested in, e.g., vegetables,
special varieties of groundnuts, pigeon peas.  
In the near future, however, the bulk of the seed market will be for seeds that can be replanted
for several seasons and need to be renewed only periodically, not every year.  This suggests
that the development path for SEMOC will differ from its counterpart large seed organizations
in other countries.  Because of its research and varietal testing capability for a wide range of
crops and links with external public and private seed organizations, SEMOC (together with
INIA, DNER and the public seed organizations) can play a unique and important role in the
development of a multi-tiered seed sector in Mozambique that can better serve the needs of
smallholders.  While some of these activities can be supported through commercial activities,
others will require additional support from the government and/or donors.    30
What kind of support is needed to develop a broader-based seed sector and increase demand
for higher-yielding varieties of seed?  First, smallholder adoption of improved seed is
constrained by the lack of information about the benefits of using improved technology. 
Underlying effective dissemination of information is the continuing need to maintain core
research and extension services for commodities and marginal areas that are unlikely to be
serviced by the for-profit private sector in the near future, including open pollinated maize,
bean, sorghum and groundnut.   These services can be provided directly by the public sector
or contracted by the government to the private sector.  SEMOC and INIA have information
about the adaptability of varieties to different agroecological zones in the country and could
work with agrochemical companies, DNER and NGOs to set up demonstrations with farmers
similar to the DNER/SG program that show the benefits of using technology packages
including improved seed, fertilizer and pesticides. 
Second, SEMOC and other potential entrants to the seed market can reduce their costs by
decentralizing seed production and marketing as much as possible.  This will require joint
efforts by companies, public agencies and NGOs to (1) provide links to NARS and
international research centers to get information and seed of appropriate varieties; (2) train
and supervise farmers in seed production, selection, storage and marketing; (3) provide basic
training on seeds and bookkeeping to rural shopkeepers; and (4) screen rural shopkeepers for
creditworthiness, provide working capital for input stocks and aggregate orders to be filled
from other input supply companies.  As part of (2), finance could be made available to enable
commodity traders to set up seed outgrower schemes under which traders would supply
improved seed, other inputs, extension advice and supervision to farmer associations.  Farmers
could repay the inputs with a specified amount of seed grain at harvest time and retain the
option of selling the crop to the trader or on the open market.  
Third, governments and NGOs can encourage the development of seed markets by
discontinuing the direct distribution of relief seed for commodities that are available
commercially and instead provide farmers with vouchers to purchase seed locally.  31
Fourth, increasing the demand for improved varieties by smallholders ultimately depends on
expanding the post-harvest market for commodities traditionally produced by smallholders
such as sorghum, groundnuts and pearl millet.  For example, small-scale millers in Zimbabwe
are experimenting with the production of ready-processed sorghum and millet weaning foods. 
Millers, stockfeed and beer industries might be given incentives such as preferential financing
to access grains from the smallholder sector and develop domestic and international markets
for new products.  
Fifth, public sector seed regulations and functions need to be rationalized.  We recommend
that the Mozambican government facilitate the development of a two-tier multiplication and
distribution system.  At the first level, foundation seed would be multiplied to certified seed
under the stringent and highly controlled conditions currently required by seed authorities and
made available for direct sale.  At the second level, seed from the first level would be bulked
by individual farmers and farmer groups in local villages under inspection by extension
workers and marketed as standard seed.  Removing compulsory seed certification and
restrictive trade licensing requirements will permit formal production of quality open
pollinated maize, bean, sorghum, and groundnut seed by smallholders and sale among
neighboring farmers.  In addition, seed companies will be able to involve smallholders in
contract seed production more easily.22 Other efforts include DNER’s basic approach of extending improved seed and practices (without
fertilizer) to participating farmers and the EC-funded Special Program to intensify production in selected areas
of Manica and Nampula provinces.
23 To ensure the best possible demonstration of the technology, DNER/SG chose farmers who had
already worked for several years with extension agents.  Extension agents also visited farmers during the
season to supervise land preparation, planting, fertilizer applications, weeding and pest control.  
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5. OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS TO IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY USE
AT THE FARM LEVEL:  DNER/SG CASE STUDY
5.1. The DNER/SG Program in Mozambique
The DNER/SG pilot project represents one of several efforts by the Direcção Nacional de
Extensão Rural to encourage intensification in Mozambique’s most productive regions.
22 
The program began operating during the 1995/96 cropping season with selected farmers
23 in
high-potential areas of Manica and Nampula Provinces (Figure 2).  DNER/SG operates in
four different agroecological regions (Regions 4, 7, 8, and 10 -- see Figure 1), which are
described in Table 5.  Farmers participating in the DNER/SG program received a package of
maize inputs on credit for use on a half hectare of their land.  The 1996/97 package (the
season in which the assessment was carried out) consisted of 15 kg of Manica SR improved
open-pollinated maize, 50 kg each of 12-24-12 NPK and urea fertilizers, and actellic, a post-
harvest storage insecticide.
The composite fertilizer was applied at planting and urea was top dressed at two leaves of
age. Improved practices included planting in rows and increased planting density (50,000
plants/ha). 
DNER/SG organized a network of shopkeepers and a credit system to channel inputs to
participating farmers.  Farmers received credit in-kind (fertilizer and seeds) at a flat interest
rate of 25%.  Credit was available to rural shopkeepers only through the DNER/SG program.
DNER/SG procured and delivered inputs to these shopkeepers, who were responsible for
delivering inputs to farmers under a contract agreement that established a credit repayment
schedule.33
5.2. Objectives and Methods
Our overall objective was to evaluate the financial and economic profitability of the
DNER/SG technology package in Nampula and Manica Provinces during the 1996/97
cropping cycle.  Specific objectives included describing how the input package was used and
what results were obtained, developing enterprise budgets to show returns per hectare and
returns to family and non-family labor by yield tercile; and quantitative analysis of the effect
of selected agronomic practices on farmer yield.34
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Table 5. Characteristics of Agroecological Regions Included in the 1996/97 DNER/SG
Survey
Sampling: We collected data for the study in a single visit during May-June 1997 (at or
immediately following harvest).  All participating DNER/SG farmers in Manica (115
farmers) and Nampula (108 farmers) were interviewed using a structured questionnaire, for a
grand total of 223 interviews.  The questionnaire is included as Appendix 2.
Questionnaire: The questionnaire included sections on the demography of the participating
household; characteristics of the DNER/SG maize field and maize production harvested by
the time of the interview; timing of each operation conducted on the field; amount and type
of labor used in each activity; amount, cost and sources of inputs used on the field; questions
asking the farmer to compare various characteristics of the improved seed with traditional
varieties; and plans for future use of inputs and participation in the DNER/SG program. 
Yield Estimates: We collected two types of yield estimates, farmer recall and crop cuts.  We
asked farmers to estimate total maize production from their DNER/SG.  For the crop cuts, we24 The correlation between farmer-reported yield and crop cut yields was surprisingly low.  Even after
the data were cleaned and villages where enumerator error was suspected were removed, the correlation factor
was only .578.  Farmer estimates were much lower than crop cut yields, even after adjusting for the possibility
that crop cut yields sometimes overestimate yields by as much as 20% (although this is less likely with such a
large sample plot size, and crop cut results in Mozambique do not appear excessive compared to other
estimates of farmer yields using improved maize technology). 
25 This suggests that DNER/SG program participants are better educated than average farmers:  the
World Bank estimates that only 33% of adults in rural and urban areas are literate (1996).
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trained enumerators to randomly select two 7 x 7 meter square areas in each field using a
standard FAO technique.  From these cuts, the enumerators counted the plants and ears,
weighed the shelled grain, and measured the moisture content of the grain.  We calculated the
yield based on this 98 square meter sample plot, converting the production to a dry-grain
equivalent per hectare.
In this case we considered the crop cut yield to be a better predictor of yield than the farmer
estimate, for two reasons
24.  First, farmers may have had difficulty estimating production
before harvest was complete (in many cases farmers were interviewed prior to the
completion of harvest).  Second, since farmers associated the enumerators/extension agents
with DNER/SG, there may have been an incentive to underreport yields if farmers thought it
might lead to partial forgiveness of the input loan.  
In practice it was not possible to obtain crop cut data on all fields.  After cleaning, 147 data
points (with crop cut yields) were included in the crop budget and regression analyses, out of
a total of 223 farmers interviewed.
5.3. Characteristics of Survey Participants
Table 6 presents some general characteristics of DNER/SG farmers participating in the case
study.  Most farmers were newcomers to the DNER/SG program: only 5% had participated
in the DNER/SG program during the previous season (1995/96), all of these in Regions 4 and
8.  Household heads in the sample had 3.8 years of formal education on average.
25  The mean
family size was 6.9 members, but differed significantly across regions.  Regions 7 and 8 had26 These estimates are comparable to findings of a 1996/97 survey carried out by the Ministry of
Agriculture, which estimated average family size as 4.7 and 6.4 persons in Nampula (R7,R8, part of R10) and
Manica Provinces (R4, part of R10), respectively (TIA 1998).
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smaller households (5.4 and 5.6 members, respectively); households in Regions 4 and 10
were larger (7.6 and 8 members).
26  
Except in Region 10, few of the sample households had recent experience with fertilizer. 
Only 6.5% of sample farmers (11% in Region 10) had used fertilizer the previous season on
the plot where DNER/SG inputs were used in 96/97.  Comparatively more farmers have used
improved varieties of seed, probably because the PESU program distributed improved seed
to farmers during the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of rehabilitation efforts.   One-
quarter of farmers in the sample reported planting new or recycled improved seed varieties in
1996/97; almost half of farmers in Region 10 (nearly all from districts of Manica Province
that border Zimbabwe) had used improved varieties.














Nampula Prov.) Grand Total
Total Total Total Total
Participated in DNER/SG
program 95/96 (%) 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 4.5
(n) 60.0 45.0 40.0 78.0 223.0
Years of education
(household head, mean) 3.8 3.4 4.1 3.8 3.8
Family size (mean) 7.6 5.4 5.6 8.0 6.9
Used chemical fertilizer in
95/96 on site of current
DNER/SG plot 5.1 0.0 7.7 10.8 6.5
(n) 51.0 45.0 39.0 74.0 217.0
Planted new or recycled
improved maize seed variety
96/97 15.0 0.0 0.0 46.3 25.0
(n) 60.0 32.0 14.0 82.0 188.0
Source: DNER/ SG Survey38
5.4. Yields: Descriptive and Econometric Results
5.4.1. Yield by Agroecological Zones
Maize yields on DNER/SG fields for 1996/97 are reported in Table 7 by yield tercile and
overall mean, together with means for Nampula and Manica Provinces for several years. 
Mean yields on the DNER/SG fields were variable (.5 - 4.9 tons/ha, sample mean 2.3
tons/ha) but they were much higher than mean yields for Nampula and Manica Provinces (.4-
1.3 tons/ha) under low input conditions in various years.  The DNER/SG 1996/97 yields
were slightly higher than those obtained under high-input regimes in neighboring Cabo
Delgado Province in 1994/95 (2.0 tons/ha), but lower than yields reported by DNER/SG in
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High-input, Cabo Delgado Prov.
(1994/95)
.9 1.9 3.2 2.0
Mean Monapo/ Meconta District
(1994/95)
.2 .3-.4 .6-.9 .4
Sources: (1) DNER/SG fields from survey data and DNER 1996; (2) means for Nampula and Manica
provinces from Early Warning Unit, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; (3) Cabo Delgado (Montepuez
District) and Monapo/Meconta results for 1994/95 from Strasberg (1997).  Cabo Delgado “high-input” results
are from the Lomaco PUPI scheme.
Table 7. Maize Yields on DNER/SG Fields and Comparisons
5.4.2. Yield Determinants Results
To analyze the factors associated with the observed variability in maize yields on DNER/SG
plots, we estimated a Cobb-Douglass production function using field-level data.  The model
was of the following form:27 Respondents provided unstructured responses to the question, “What weather, programmatic or
pest factors positively or negatively affected your production this year on your DNER/SG maize plot?”  During
the modeling phase of this research, we began by including each of these factors -- weather, program or pests -
- as independent dichotomous variables.  We used a stepwise procedure to eliminate each variable if it was not
statistically significant.  WEATHER remained in the model as the only one of these three variables that was
(nearly) statistically significant.  It should be noted that the results change very little when WEATHER is
excluded.  
40




YIELD = maize grain yield per hectare,
LABOR DAYS = total adult equivalent labor days, family and non-family, per
hectare, excluding harvest labor
WEEK = planting week where WEEK = 1 if first week of November, 2
if second week of November ... fourth week of January
PLANT DENSITY = Number of maize plants per hectare estimated from crop cut
area
REGION 4 = 1 if farmer is in Region 4
0 otherwise
REGION 7 = 1 if farmer is in Region 7
0 otherwise
REGION 8 = 1 if farmer is in Region 8
0 otherwise 
(REGION 10 represents omitted category.)
WEATHER = 1 if farmer stated that abnormal rainfall patterns or high winds on his
plot negatively affected yield
Table 8 reports means and standard deviation of all variables used in the model and Table 9
reports model results. 41
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
YIELD 2,307 1,311
LABOR DAYS 106 63
WEEK 7.7 2.7
PLANT DENSITY 35,659 8,805
REGION 4 31 percent = 1
REGION 7 11 percent = 1
REGION 8 17 percent = 1
Table 8. Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables in Maize Yield Model
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value
ln (LABOR DAYS) 0.194 0.093 0.04
WEEK -0.002 0.028 0.41
ln (PLANT DENSITY) 0.526 0.220 0.02
REGION 4 -0.237 0.129 0.07
REGION 7 -0.929 0.246 0.00
REGION 8 0.174 0.238 0.47
WEATHER -0.171 0.121 0.16
Constant 1.590 2.238 0.48
Dependent variable = ln(YIELD)
N=143
Adjusted R-sq = 0.262
F-stat = 5.4, Significance = 0.00
Source: DNER/SG Survey
Table 9. Results of Maize Yield Determinants Model28 The use of herbicide on fertilized maize was found to be an important feature of the Montepuez
high-input maize scheme.  For further details, see Strasberg (1997).
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5.4.3. Interpretation of Econometric Results
Key findings from the econometric model include:
Planting density had a positive and significant effect on yield.  This suggests that yields
could be increased, ceteris paribus, by increasing planting density from the observed mean of
35,659 plants/ha. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the recommended density is 50,000
plants/ha.  Previous on-farm productivity research in the same region of Mozambique
showed that labor availability at peak weeding periods was a key determinant of productivity
(Strasberg, 1997). The positive and significant coefficient found on the LABOR variable
suggests that labor availability -- possibly at such peak times as weeding -- represents a
production constraint for some households.  It may be important to consider practical
ways for participating households to ease this constraint.  Possible alternatives include
increasing the use of family or hired labor or adopting herbicide.
28  The results also show the
marginal productivity of a labor day (at mean labor application rates) are equal to 6.3 kgs
(Region 8), 4.4 kgs (Region 10), 3.8 kgs (Region 4) and 1.8 kgs (Region 7) of maize.
5.4.4. Other Factors Affecting Production in 1996/97
Actual production in the DNER/SG plots was much lower than results reported for the
DNER/SG program in 1995/96, which ranged from an average of 3.6 tons/ha in Sussundenga
(Manica Province) to 5.7 tons/ha in Meconta-Ratane (Nampula Province) (DNER 1996).
Comments by sample farmers provide additional insights about natural factors affecting
production on DNER/SG plots during the 1996/97 season (Table 10).  According to farmers,
the unseasonal and heavy rains that delayed planting and other operations, flooded fields and
caused maize cobs to rot in the field were the primary factor affecting yields.  Forty-seven
percent of households reported abnormal rainfall.  An additional 17 % reported insect and
wild animal damage (from termites, stalkborers, rabbits, monkeys and rats) that reduced
yields. 43
Successful program implementation, including timely delivery of inputs and extension
assistance, is also critical to achieving targeted yield levels among participating farmers.
During the survey  participants were asked open-ended questions about possible problems
related to program implementation.  Table 11 presents the responses to these questions by
district.  It is worth noting, given the young nature of the program, that 74% of households
overall cited no particular implementation problem.  Of the remaining 26% of participants, the
most significant complaint about 1996/97 program implementation was that seed and fertilizer
arrived late, forcing farmers to plant later than they would have liked.  This problem appears
to have been particularly concentrated in Ribaue District in Nampula, and Barue and
Sussendenga Districts of Manica where more than 35% of households noted late input
delivery as a concern. Among the two other types of implementation problems cited by
participants, poor seed quality and lack of and/or improper extension advice were the most
frequent problems.  Poor seed quality was an important issue for 16% of Sussendenga
participants.  Fourteen percent of Monapo/Meconta participants felt that they received
inadequate extension service; this problem was mentioned by fewer farmers elsewhere.






Weather Pests Soil Quality / Soil Erosion
Manica Province — percentage of households reporting a problem this year — 
   Manica 44 7 0
   Barue 48 24 0
   Sussundenga 60 14 5
Nampula Province 
   Monapo/Meconta 40 11 0
   Ribaue 36 2 0
   Malema 65 74 0
Total 47 17 144
5.5. Financial and Economic Analysis of the DNER/SG Technology Package
Table 12 presents key results from the financial and economic analysis by region.  The
complete financial and economic budgets can be found in Appendix 3, Tables 16 through 18.
The financial attractiveness of a given production technology depends on the physical
response of the crop to the technology, the cost of obtaining that physical response, and on
the prices received when the crop is sold or the opportunity cost of home consumption.  The
crop’s physical response and the cost of obtaining it are (in turn) partly a function of the way
in which a farmer applies the technology, i.e., the timing and intensity of field activities.  In
practice, any technology is affected by variation in all of these dimensions.  Farmer
understanding of, commitment to, and ability to apply a technology can vary a great deal.
Problems with input availability may alter the timing of certain activities or even the ability
to carry them out.  Agroecological conditions, and prices that farmers receive can vary
significantly over time and space.  In assessing the financial attractiveness of a technology,
then, the analyst must reflect the key dimensions of variation that will affect outcome.29 11,500 meticais=$1.
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Arrival Poor Seed Quality
Lack of / or Improper
Extension
Advice
— percent of households reporting — 
 Manica Province
   Manica 95 0 2 5
   Barue 65 35 0 0
   Sussundenga 58 40 16 0
Nampula Province 
   Monapo/Meconta 74 17 0 14
   Ribaue 64 36 0 2
   Malema 78 13 0 9
Total 74 22 4 5
With this in mind, enterprise budgets were constructed based on yield terciles and for varying
price levels (Table 12).  Two measures of outcome are reported for each yield tercile and
price level: net returns in meticais
29 per hectare and net returns per day of family and mutual
labor applied to the crop.  This latter measure can be compared to opportunity costs of labor
in the study areas to assess the relative attractiveness of the technology under varying yield
and price levels.  All field level data came from the DNER/SG survey described in this
paper.  Prices came from the Sistema de Informação de Mercados Agrícolas (SIMA) of
MAP’s Directorate of Economics.  Because farmgate prices were not available, average









 (Western Manica Province)
Region 10
 (Malema, Nampula Province)
Maize Yield Tercile
Budget Item 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
YIELD (mt/ha) 
a 0.9 2.1 3.4 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.2 2.5 3.8 1.2 2.6 3.8 1.3 2.9 4.9
TOTAL FAMILY/MUTUAL LABOR DAYS
(adult equiv. days/ha) 77 124 102 80 73 105 81 47 73 97 109 132 67 110 88
N  used in calculations 14 15 15 5 6 5 8 8 8 12 13 13 7 7 7
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
a.  Net Income 
b            
(‘0000 meticais/ha)
   June 97 Price (137.7) (34.5) 37.5 (90.7) (77.9) (44.1) (44.8) 31.7 124.6 (118.7) (39.0) 42.2 (40.3) 54.8 169.4
   Dec 97 Price (22.6) 272.9 545.5 (77.1) (52.9) 21.0 (24.1) 86.7 215.8 51.0 341.1 609.3 16.5 204.8 430.7
   Jul-Dec 97 Price  (90.4) 98.1 259.1 (94.6) (79.7) (38.7) (50.8) 28.4 124.2 (47.3) 125.8 289.9 (36.4) 75.4 210.1
b.  Net Income per Family and Mutual Labor Day
   (‘0000 meticais/ha) 
c
   June 97 Price (1.8) (0.3) 0.4 (1.1) (1.1) (0.4) (0.6) 0.7 1.7 (1.2) (0.4) 0.3 (0.6) 0.5 1.9
   Dec 97 Price (0.3) 2.2 5.4 (1.0) (0.7) 0.2 (0.3) 1.9 3.0 0.5 3.1 4.6 0.3 1.9 4.9
   Jul-Dec 97 Price (1.2) 0.8 2.5 (1.2) (1.1) (0.4) (0.6) 0.6 1.7 (0.5) 1.2 2.2 (0.5) 0.7 2.4
   Median wage rate per 8 hour day
   (‘0000 meticais) 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.6
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
a.  Maize Deficit in Southern Africa
    NET INCOME (‘0000 meticais/ha) 
    HTC 
d (121.5) 12.0 186.8 (157.8) (146.7) (148.1) (158.8) (91.5) (57.7) (64.6) 92.7 236.1 (106.2) (67.6) 0.4
    LTC 
e (95.5) 68.6 275.3 (115.2) (91.4) (48.3) (68.6) 77.2 193.6 (29.9) 160.8 333.9 (15.7) 126.8 318.6
  Export to  Malawi (not a viable option at this time) (87.1) (51.2) 34.2 4.7 225.1 419.8 (not a viable option at this time) 58.0 299.1 608.3
b.  Maize Surplus in Southern Africa
    NET INCOME (‘0000 meticais/ha)
    HTC (161.9) (87.2) 26.1 (180.3) (178.8) (214.0) (217.3) (209.5) (238.2) (121.7) (28.8) 57.4 (165.1) (205.1) (230.8)
    LTC (135.9) (30.7) 114.6 (137.7) (123.5) (114.2) (127.1) (40.8) 13.1 (87.0) 39.3 155.2 (74.5) (10.7) 87.4
    Export to Int’l Mkt (not a viable option at this time) (128.7) (110.7) (87.9) (103.8) 62.8 85.1 (not a viable option at this time) (51.0) 44.2 179. 65
Source: Field data from DNER/SG Survey 
Notes to Table 12
a Estimated from crop cuts.  Assumes storage losses of 1% per month.
b Gross revenue - (cash costs + interest + purchased labor).
c Net income/adult equivalent family + mutual labor days.
d Long distance road haulage cost is estimated at USD 0.05/ton/km (Coulter 1995)
e Long distance road haulage cost is estimated at USD 0.03/ton/km (Coulter 1995)47
Interest rates, and the cost of fertilizer and seed, were fixed for DNER/SG participants
(though package costs were higher in Manica Province than Nampula- see Table 12).  Other
inputs such as animal traction, tractor services, and family and hired labor varied and were
valued at the actual cost incurred by the farmers.  We used three levels of output prices in the
budget: average June 1997 (immediately after harvest), average December 1997, and average
July-December 1997. 
5.5.1. Financial Budget Results by Agroecological Zone, Yield Tercile and Price Level
Gains from Storage. We calculated income and cost streams for three different scenarios,
when the farmer sells maize (a) in June, immediately following harvest; (b) in December, 6
months after harvest, and (c) midway between July and December.  December and mean
July-December yields were adjusted for storage losses estimated at 1% per month.  Estimates
of gross revenue (GR) were obtained by multiplying yield by price.  The December and July-
December average GR estimates were adjusted to account for the compounded earnings
foregone by storing maize rather than selling it in June.  
Because of a sharp rise in maize prices between June and December, farmers in some regions 
more than doubled gross revenues by storing maize for later sale instead of selling
immediately after harvest.  Gains were highest in Manica Province survey areas closest to
Maputo, the main consumption center (Region 4 and part of Region 10), with 105% and
165% gains in GR between June and December, respectively.  Gross revenues in Regions 7
and 8 climbed by 84% and 69% in the same period.  Though farmers can normally expect the
maize price to increase in this period, prices may not rise so steeply every year.  For
example, in Manica Province the retail price of maize rose by 310%, 200%, and 214%
between June and December in 1994, 1995 and 1997, respectively, but in 1993 and 1996 the
price rises were only 25% and 16% (SIMA 1998). 
High Cost of Fertilizer and Seed.  Production costs included in the enterprise budget were the
costs of the fertilizer and seed package, animal traction, tractor services, interest on the input
package, and purchased labor.  All of the costs were relatively minor except for the fertilizer
and seed package.  With interest, fertilizer and seed costs made up 83-94% of total cash
expenditures related to production.  Region 7 and 8 farmers were able to negotiate a lower
price for the fertilizer and seed package with DNER/SG than farmers in other regions. 
Under competitive conditions, however, input costs in Regions 7 and 8 are likely to be higher
than in Regions 4 and 10, which are closer to the main ports of Maputo and Beira and
consequently have lower transportation costs.  
The cost of the fertilizer and seed package (including interest) was also high in relation to the
cost paid by Ethiopian SG participants who used a similar package of inputs on maize during
the 1997 season (25 kg hybrid seed, 100 kg DAP, 100 kg urea per hectare).  Like
Mozambique, Ethiopia has poor infrastructure and imported fertilizer must be transported
over long distances to reach participating farmers.  The dollar equivalent of the Ethiopian
fertilizer and seed package was $94 per hectare, compared to $104 per hectare for
Mozambican farmers in Nampula Province (Regions 7,8, part of Region 10) and $135 per
hectare in Manica Province (Region 4, part of Region 10).30 The estimated wage rate is based on DNER/SG Survey data.
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Break-Even Analysis 
a Region 4 Region 7 Region 8 Region 10 Total
June price
   Net income/ha >0 (%) 27 0  58 44 36
   Net income/ha <0 (%) 73 100       42  56 64
December price
   Net income/ha >0 (%) 89 25  79 88 80
   Net income/ha <0 (%) 11 75    21 12 20
July-December avg. price
   Net income/ha >0 (%) 64 6  63 75 62
   Net income/ha <0 (%) 36 94  38 25  39
a  assumes storage losses of 1% per month
Source: Field data from DNER/SG Survey; Prices from SIMA Market Information System
Table 13. Break-Even Analysis
Variability of Net Income. We calculated the net income per hectare by subtracting cash
costs, interest, and wage labor payments from gross revenue realized when farmers sell
(alternatively) in June, December, and midway between July and December.  Storing maize
for several months instead of selling immediately after harvest dramatically affected farmer
gains.  Table 13 shows the proportion of farmers in the sample and within each region who
profited or lost when they sold maize in different periods.  When farmers sold in June, only
36% of sample farmers made a profit; the remainder lost money. At the December price, by
contrast, 80% of farmers in the sample profited and 20% lost money.  Of farmers who sold
midway between July and December, 62% gained and 38% lost.  The proportion of gainers
and losers varied considerably by region and period.  All of the Region 7 farmers who sold in
June lost money; 25% turned a profit if they waited until December to sell.  In Region 4,
27% of farmers made a profit at June prices, and 89% took a profit at December prices.    
Net income per labor day was calculated by dividing net income per hectare by the total
number of days worked by family members and friends and relatives who assisted with farm
activities in exchange for similar help on their own plots (Table 12).  These results can be
compared to the prevailing wage rate
30 in the study areas to assess the relative attractiveness
of the technology under various yield and price levels.  Estimated wage rates vary from 6000
meticais/day in Malema District, Nampula Province to 20,000 meticais per day in
East/Central Manica Province. 
When maize was sold at June prices, net income per labor day was lower than the prevailing
wage rate in all regions, ranging from an average loss of 8400 mt per day in Region 7
(Nampula Province) to a gain of 5500 mt per day in Region 8 (Nampula Province).  If
farmers sold midway between July and December, net income per labor day was higher but
still below the estimated wage rate in all regions.  Net income per day varied from a loss of
8400 mt per day in Region 7 (Nampula) to an 11,300 mt gain in Region 10 (Nampula and
Manica Provinces).  At December prices, farmers still realized average losses of 4400 mt/day31 This analysis draws heavily on a 1995 study of economic efficiency and market pricing in
Mozambique (Coulter 1995).  For the DNER/SG case study, a few prices have been updated but most of the
assumptions of transportation, handling and marketing costs used by Coulter have been retained.  For details
of the analysis see Appendix 4.
32 Long distance road haulage costs using backhaul are estimated at USD .03/ton/km (low) and USD
.05/ton/km (high) (Coulter 1995).
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in Region 7.  Returns were slightly lower than the estimated wage rate in Region 8 (13,900
mt), but exceeded the wage rate elsewhere: 26,700 mt in Region 4 and 29,700 mt in Region
10.  
5.5.2. Economic Budget Results by Region and Yield Tercile
The financial analysis in the preceding section showed the profitability of the DNER/SG
package to farmers in 1996/97.  Economic analysis shows the costs and returns to society as
a whole, using international maize, fertilizer, and seed prices.  This type of analysis is
important because the elimination of domestic price controls on most commodities and the
increasingly free flow of goods across international borders mean that in the future
Mozambican farmers will compete with other producers in southern Africa and the world to
supply both domestic and international consumers.  The economic analysis will help answer
these questions: (a) how profitable is intensified maize production in different regions when
farmers face international instead of domestic prices?  (b) How will profitability be affected
in years when southern Africa has a maize surplus compared to deficit years? And (c) how
will profitability be affected when farmers face full international market prices for fertilizer
and seed (as well as other inputs) instead of prices that are subsidized or taxed by projects or
the government?
31
We estimated farm-level prices and profitability for two scenarios, the contrasting conditions
of maize deficit and surplus in the southern Africa region.  Details of the calculations of
import and export parity prices for maize, import parity prices for fertilizer, and economic
prices for improved seed can be found in Appendix 4.  In essence, the farm-level price
calculations estimate the maximum price which, if paid to farmers in the different regions,
would be comparable to the full cost of maize imported from either the United States (in the
case of a Southern Africa maize deficit) or from South Africa (if there is a regional maize
surplus).
Deficit Year.  When southern Africa has a maize deficit, Mozambican farmers compete with
U.S. or other world maize producers to supply the large Maputo consumer market and other
consumers in the region.  The main results of the analysis for the maize deficit scenario are
summarized in Table 12.  Three cases were considered: (a) high transport costs, (b) low
transport costs, and (c) low transport costs, with Nampula Province farmers (Regions 7, 8,
and part of Region 10) exporting maize to Malawi rather than Maputo.
32.
High transport costs.  Under the assumption of high transport costs, conditions are relatively
favorable for farmers in Region 4 and Manica Province portions of Region 10 (intensified50
maize production is profitable for two-thirds of farmers in each area), but much less so for
Nampula Province farmers far from the Maputo markets (Regions 7,8, part of Region 10).  In
the Nampula Province areas, intensified maize was barely profitable for the top tercile of
farmers in Region 10 and unprofitable for all the rest.
Low transport costs.  With lower transport costs, profits increased for Manica Province
farmers (Region 4, part of Region 10) using improved seed and fertilizer, but the package
was still unprofitable for the lower tercile of farmers in each area.  Reduced transport costs
did not help farmers in Region 7 (intensified maize was still unprofitable for all terciles), but
seed and fertilizer use became profitable for the top two terciles of Regions 8 and 10
(Nampula Province).
Northern farmers export to Malawi.  Farmers in Region 7, 8 and Nampula Province portions
of Region 10 were best off if they could export maize to Malawi rather than transporting
maize the much greater distance to Maputo markets.  In this case, intensified maize
production was profitable for all of the farmers in Regions 8 and 10 (Nampula) and the top
tercile of farmers in Region 7.
Surplus Year.  When the southern Africa region has a maize surplus, Mozambican producers
compete with South African maize producers in the Maputo market.  As a result, farm-level
prices are much lower across the board than in the maize deficit scenario.  In 1996/97,
Nampula Province (Regions 7, 8, 10) farmers were affected much more severely than their
counterparts in Manica Province (Regions 4, 10).  In the surplus scenario, Manica Province
prices fell by one-third from deficit price levels, but in Nampula Province prices fell by an
estimated 50-85%. Key results for the surplus maize case are presented in Table 12.
High transport costs.  Assuming that transportation costs are high, maize intensification was
profitable only for the top tercile of farmers in Regions 4 and 10 in Manica Province, and
unprofitable for all farmers in Regions 7, 8 and areas of Region 10 within Nampula Province. 
Low transport costs.  With lower transport costs, use of the improved maize package was
profitable in the top yield tercile of Region 4 and the top two terciles of Region 10 in Manica
Province, unprofitable in all of Region 7 and all but the top yield terciles in Regions 8 and 10
(Nampula Province).
Northern Farmers export to the international market.  If there were a maize surplus in
southern Africa, farmers in northern Mozambique might be better off exporting their maize
to countries in other regions of Africa through the port of Nacala.  Weather patterns in
Tanzania and Kenya are different from southern Africa’s and may provide a market for
surplus Mozambican maize. For example, Koester showed that production in northern
Mozambique is negatively correlated with that in southern Tanzania (1986, cited in Coulter
1995).  Maize production in neighboring Malawi has been declining for some years, and this
country may also be a market for Mozambican maize even when the region as a whole is in
surplus.  If export to international markets were possible, the analysis indicates that maize
intensification would be profitable for the top two yield terciles in Regions 8
(Monapo/Meconta) and 10 (Nampula), although it would still be unprofitable for farmers in
Region 7 (Ribaue).  Export to Malawi would likely be more profitable than to the
international market.51
5.5.3. Farmer Opinions About DNER/SG and Improved Technology
Comments about DNER/SG.  Most farmers attributed the mixed results of the demonstration
trials to poor weather and maintained an overwhelmingly positive attitude toward the
DNER/SG program and improved seed and fertilizer technology.  Over 90% of sample
farmers said they wanted to participate in the DNER/SG program again during the 1997/98
season (Appendix 5, Table 19).  The highest proportion of farmers wishing to enroll again in
1997/98 (98%) came from Region 7, which had the poorest results with the DNER/SG
technology during 1996/97.  Some of the farmers’ enthusiasm may be explained by the fact
that DNER/SG has not started to collect loan repayments for the 1996/97 season, and it is not
clear that farmers will be expected to pay back these loans at all.  As of December 1997, less
than 20% of farmers had made any payments on their loan from the previous season.  Thus,
farmers may now regard the DNER/SG program as a grant rather than a loan program, a
potentially dangerous precedent that can undermine the development of private sector input
supply channels in these areas. 
Comments About Improved Seed and Fertilizer Technology.  Most sample farmers were
convinced that the use of Manica seed and chemical fertilizer improved maize yields (62%
and 73% for seed and fertilizer, respectively) and wanted to continue using the technology in
the future.  More than 80% said that even if credit were not available, they would buy
improved seed and fertilizer with their own cash resources.  Most farmers thought seed was
more essential than fertilizer: asked to rank purchased inputs in order of importance, two-
thirds thought improved seed was most important and one-third ranked chemical fertilizer
first (Appendix 5, Tables 20 and 21).
In other parts of southern Africa adoption of improved varieties has been affected by
smallholder perceptions that improved maize is inferior to local varieties with regard to
color, taste, and storage and milling properties (Howard 1994, Smale and Heisey 1997). 
There may be fewer problems with Manica seed because it was derived from a local
Mozambican population and has probably retained many of the qualities that farmers value in
"local" seed varieties. Table 21 (Appendix 5) presents farmer responses to questions about
how the characteristics of Manica seed compare to local varieties.  Half of the farmers said
that they preferred Manica’s color and taste to those of local varieties.  The other results were
ambiguous because the questions were difficult (particularly on storage and milling) for
farmers who had no previous experience with Manica seed. Twenty-three percent said that
Manica stored better than other varieties, 35% said it was worse, while 40% could not yet
comment.  Thirty-one percent said they preferred Manica’s milling characteristics to local,
fifteen percent said they preferred the local varieties, and half could not distinguish between
them yet.52
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our analysis of the DNER/SG program suggests that there is substantial scope for increasing
farmer yields and agricultural production in Mozambique through the use of inputs such as
improved seed varieties, fertilizer and pesticides.  Sustained adoption of these inputs by
farmers will depend on the successful implementation of policies and programs that increase
the profitability of input use by (1) improving smallholder awareness of the benefits and
correct use of inputs; (2) reducing the cost of inputs and ensuring their timely availability;
and (3) reducing the cost of marketing commodity outputs and developing new markets for
smallholder commodities.
6.1.  Improving Smallholder Awareness of the Benefits and Correct Use of Inputs  
Most sample farmers were convinced that the use of Manica seed and chemical fertilizer
improved maize yields.  The successful DNER/SG experience in Mozambique (and the
DNER/SG experience in other countries) suggests that it would be useful to replicate this
model elsewhere in the country with maize and other crops.
Since SG resources are limited, other NGOs, JVCs or private sector firms (including
agrochemical and seed firms) could provide support to expanded DNER efforts in this area. 
Several modifications in the way the program is implemented would increase its
effectiveness.  First, the process of identifying candidate crops and areas for intensification
should include a feasibility study to determine (a) the potential yield gains from use of
improved technology and (b) estimates of the farm-level profitability of the input package.  
Second, the database of information from INIA and NGO trials on yield response to fertilizer
and improved seed varieties should be more effectively utilized: fine-tuning seed and
fertilizer recommendations to match the diversity of agroclimatic conditions found in the
country can increase yields and reduce costs of improved technology.  The addition of
complementary technologies, e.g., storage pesticides and herbicides, may increase the farm-
level profitability of the package.  Storage pesticide would be especially important, allowing
farmers to take advantage of potential seasonal price rises without the risk of losing a large
proportion of their stored grain to insect pests.  Herbicide would help address the weeding
labor constraint, which becomes even more binding when fertilizer is used. Third, greater
attention should be given to training extension agents and ensuring that they are providing
adequate technical support on appropriate planting and fertilizer methods and weeding times.
6.2.  Investments to Reduce Costs and Ensure Timely Availability of Inputs
In Mozambique the cost of inputs is very high compared to the output prices currently faced
by farmers.  Using June prices, the ratio of the cost of the total input package to the price of
one kilogram of maize ranges from 1,504 in Region 8 (Monapo/Meconta, Nampula
Province) to 2,074 in Regions 4 and 10 in Manica Province.  This means that farmers must
produce between 1,504 and 2,074 kilograms of maize to pay for the package of inputs used
on one hectare.  Using prices from our economic analysis, we calculated ratios in Nampula33 Using the maize price when exporting to Malawi and assuming low transport costs.
34 Using the lowest maize price -- selling in Maputo in a surplus year -- and the highest input cost.
35 Transport and handling costs between the port and farmgate add 31-64% to the import parity price
of fertilizer for farmers in Nampula and Manica Provinces.
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that range from 717
33 to 3,165
34.  In Manica, the economic ratios ranged from a low of 700 to
a high of only 873.  These economic ratios are similar to the financial ratios faced by
Ethiopian farmers in 1996/97, who only needed to produce 748 kilograms of maize to pay
for a similar package of inputs (using comparable prices immediately after harvest).  Not
coincidentally, the SG package was highly profitable for nearly all Ethiopian SG participants. 
This analysis suggests that if the export market is developed, especially to Malawi, Nampula 
farmers can expect to face ratios of around 1,000 or lower.  This means that they will begin
to make money with yields of 1 ton per hectare.  With yields of 3 tons and more attainable on
smallholder fields with this technology, the potential profits to farmers become extremely
attractive.
Per-ton seed prices are comparable or lower than those in neighboring countries, but seed is
expensive for Mozambican farmers relative to the output prices they receive.  The average
ratio of OPV seed to grain price is 4.5 in sub-Saharan Africa and 5.4 in southern Africa,
compared to 7.1 in Mozambique (CIMMYT 1994).  Late delivery of inputs was a problem
for many of this year’s DNER/SG participants and is also a concern of smallholder contract
farmers working with JVCs and other large cotton firms.  Major factors affecting input costs
and delivery are the poor state of transportation infrastructure
35, the lack of wholesale and
retail outlets for inputs in the rural areas, and weak demand for fertilizer and seed by
smallholders. Input dealers cannot deal in large enough quantities to realize significant
economies of scale.  
A four-part approach is recommended to reduce the cost of getting inputs to smallholders: (1)
improving the transportation infrastructure; (2) reorienting the KRII program to give greater
flexibility and control to private participants; (3) broadening the role of farmer associations
in input distribution and encouraging private agribusiness to expand the wholesale and retail
network for inputs; and (4) promoting the diversification of the seed subsector, especially
more informal seed replication and distribution.
6.2.1.  Improving Transport Infrastructure
The Mozambican government and donors are well aware of the need to improve transport
infrastructure: the Roads and Coastal Shipping Project II (ROCs II) represents an important
step in improving conditions.  Roughly half of Mozambique’s estimated 43,000 kilometers of
paved, earth/gravel, and feeder roads are scheduled for rehabilitation by the year 2000. 
Additional investments will be required to upgrade the remaining portions of the network
and maintain improved road surfaces.54
6.2.2.  Reorienting the Japanese KRII Program 
The KRII program provides an important source of credit, but the current system of
centralized ordering and distribution of KRII inputs is retarding the development of the private
input procurement and distribution system in Mozambique.  We propose that the centralized
ordering and distribution system for KRII inputs be abandoned and that the KRII program
become mainly a financing mechanism to enable private firms and farmer associations to order
the quantities and types of agrochemicals they need, and pay back the amount over time. 
Using the KRII funds as a source of credit, but leaving the process of aggregating orders,
tendering for bids, and arranging for importation in the hands of the Mozambican private
sector, would reduce costs through economies of scale and the long time lag between order
and receipt of KRII goods.  If it is not possible to reconfigure KRII in this way, the program
should be eliminated.
6.2.3. Broadening the Role of Farmer Associations in Input Distribution and Facilitating the
Development of Private Input Marketing Channels
Strengthen Farmer Associations.  Building smallholder demand for improved inputs while
simultaneously creating a network of wholesale and retail input suppliers will be a long-term
process. Government and donor funds could be used to strengthen the capacity of smallholder
associations to help reduce the cost of input procurement and delivery by aggregating input
orders, guaranteeing payment, and repackaging bulk orders for delivery to individual
customers.  One innovative experiment with farmer associations has had good results and
should be studied more closely to determine how the model could be expanded to other areas
in a cost-effective way.  In 1996/97 the Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA) began
working with groups of farmers producing cotton for 3 JVCs operating in northern
Mozambique.  The farmers had been unhappy with the late delivery and quality of inputs
delivered by the company.  Under new agreements negotiated by 18 associations supported by
CLUSA, companies agreed to channel their input supply and extension services, which had
traditionally been supplied to individuals, through associations instead.  This strategy reduced
the cost to JVCs of service provision and improved the timeliness of input delivery.   
If supplier credit is made available through a redesigned KRII and other donor programs,
Mozambican agrochemical firms might similarly work through farmer associations to
aggregate orders and make inputs available locally on a cash basis.  In the future, the
DNER/SG program could work with CLUSA and farmer associations as well as individual
stockists to organize input procurement, delivery and guarantee payment of credit.  
Reduce Barriers to Market Entry.  Policy changes have made it easier to import and sell
inputs, but several administrative barriers to market entry remain.  Retail licenses must be
approved by provincial governors and are difficult and time-consuming to obtain, for example. 
Lack of credit is widely perceived to be a major constraint to the development of input
markets.  However, the severity of the problem is not well understood, and the discouraging
experience with scaled-up credit programs in many SSA countries calls for careful
examination of alternative approaches to increasing credit availability.  55
Discontinue Direct Distribution of Inputs by Government and NGOs. The Mozambican
government and NGOs can encourage the development of input markets by discontinuing the
direct distribution of relief or otherwise subsidized fertilizer and seed for commodities that
are available commercially, instead providing farmers with vouchers to purchase inputs from
local sources. 
Provide Technical Training for Stockists.  Another important constraint is the lack of trained
personnel in rural areas who are capable of handling products safely, giving competent
advice about their utilization, and bookkeeping.  Innovative NGO programs such as Citizens
Network are helping to train shopkeepers in Manica Province in collaboration with SG.  In
Zimbabwe, CARE’s AGENT program also provides (in addition to technical training in
input use, storage and bookkeeping) credit guarantees until the stockists graduate to regular
supplier lines of credit after 6-8 months in the program.
Diversification of the Seed Sector.  Mozambican farmers in selected agroecological areas are
becoming aware of the value of hybrid maize seed, and this market may expand over the
coming years.  For the foreseeable future, however, the bulk of demand will be for open-
pollinated seed that can be replanted for several seasons, not renewed every year.  This
suggests that the development path for SEMOC will need to differ from counterpart formal
seed organizations in neighboring countries that have relied heavily on centrally grown,
centrally processed hybrid maize as a flagship product.  
Because of its research and varietal testing capability for a wide range of crops and links with
external public and private seed organizations SEMOC, (together with INIA, DNER and the
public seed organizations) can play a unique role in the development of a multi-tiered seed
sector in Mozambique that can better serve the needs of smallholders.  Though some
activities of the seed system can be supported by commercial firms, others will require
support from the government and/or donors.  Examples follow.
Decentralize Seed Production and Marketing.  First, SEMOC and other potential entrants to
the seed market can reduce their costs by decentralizing seed production and marketing.  This
will require joint efforts by companies, public agencies and NGOs to (a) provide links to
NARS, international research centers and the other private sector to get information and seed
of appropriate varieties; (b) train extension agents to choose appropriate varieties for
different agroecological zones and types of clients; (c) train and supervise farmers in seed
production, selection, storage and marketing; and (d) provide technical training to rural
stockists. 
Review Seed System Regulations and Functions.  Seed sub-sector regulations need to be
rationalized to encourage the development of the informal seed sector. We recommend a
two-tier seed multiplication and distribution system.  At the first level, foundation seed
would be multiplied to certified seed under the stringent and highly controlled conditions
currently required by seed authorities and made available for direct sale.  In the second stage,
seed from the first level would be bulked by individual farmers and farmer groups in local
villages under inspection by extension workers and marketed as standard seed.  
Removing compulsory seed certification and restrictive trade licensing requirements will
permit formal production of quality open-pollinated maize and other crops by smallholders56
and sale among neighboring farmers.  In addition, seed companies will be able to involve
smallholders in contract seed production more easily.  
6.3.  Reducing the Cost of Marketing Commodity Outputs and Developing New
Markets for  Smallholder Commodities
Increasing the demand for improved inputs by smallholders ultimately depends on expanding
the post-harvest market for commodities produced by smallholders.  It will be especially
important to develop foreign markets for Mozambican commodities.  Any strategy to
develop regional export potential in food and other crops in northern Mozambique must be
active on many fronts.  Other needs include continued improvement of port management and
roads, especially secondary and tertiary routes; simplification of licensing and other
bureaucratic procedures related to trade;  improved access to credit for agricultural trade; and
continued development of farmer associations.  In addition, the government can facilitate
regional trade in three ways.
6.3.1.  Making a Clear Policy Statement that the Government will not Prohibit Maize
Exports even During Drought Years  
If traders expect that government will close off profit opportunities during years of regional
deficit, they will not invest in their capacity to efficiently and regularly assemble and export
large quantities of grain.  The result will be continued small-scale operations, high costs, low
prices to farmers, and high prices for consumers.
6.3.2.  Collaborating with the Private Sector to Create a Regional Trade Information
Network  
An effort is currently underway in MICTUR and should be strengthened.  It will be
especially important to coordinate this effort with the existing market information system
(SIMA) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.  If successful, such a network could
eventually provide the basis for an agricultural commodity exchange in the area.
6.3.3.  Removing Bureaucratic Barriers to the Formalization of Farmer Associations so They
Can Continue to Expand Their Marketing Activities 
Strengthened farmer associations can play a key role in reducing the costs of marketing
commodity outputs both domestically and internationally.  During the 1995/96 season,
CLUSA helped farmer associations working in JVC cotton areas to set up management
systems that will enable them to weigh, record and deliver the cotton to the gins themselves
for a higher price.  Farmer groups are also beginning to coordinate exports.  In 1995/96, 9
CLUSA-assisted associations involving about 3000 farmers in the Ribaue area coordinated to
sell 1200 tons of maize to V&M, a South African company The buyer paid the associations
1000 meticais/kg compared to the market price of 750 meticais/kg.  Part of the proceeds were
invested in the association’s development fund.  JVCs and other large commercial farms can
also play a role in seeking out new markets and contracting smallholders for the production
of these commodities.  For example, several cotton firms interested in encouraging a cotton-
maize or cotton-maize-legume rotation are actively exploring alternative markets for maize
and legumes such as pigeon pea and groundnuts.57
APPENDIX 1
FERTILIZER RESPONSE AND NATIONAL MAIZE VARIETY LIST58



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































grain 123 30 30 1625 2100 475 29 2.0 7.9
Source: Adapted from Geurts 199767






SR-52 (hybrid) Imported 155-160
R-201 (hybrid) Imported 138
PNR-473 (hybrid) Imported 130
Obregon INIA 150
Obregon flint INIA 150
Umbeluzi INIA 120-140
Silver Mine INIA 140-155
Semoc 1 SEMOC 115-130
UCA Imported 135-145
Ferke 7822 INIA 134-145
Obregon 7643 INIA 130-150
R-200 (hybrid) Imported 120-135
SC 501 (hybrid) Imported 120-135
PAN 6671 Imported 125-140
PAN 437 (hybrid) Imported 125-140
SM 401 (hybrid) SEMOC 115-130
SM 402 (hybrid) SEMOC 125-140
SM 404 (hybrid) SEMOC 120-135
SM 504 (hybrid) SEMOC 130-150
SM 612 (hybrid) SEMOC 135-160
SM 652 (hybrid) SEMOC 135-160
Manica SR SEMOC 125-145
Source:  República de Moçambique 1995. 
Table 15. National Variety List for Maize68
APPENDIX 2
1996/97 DNER/SG SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE69
NOTE
You have the right to decline to participate in this interview; your
participation is entirely voluntary.  If you decide to participate, all of the
information collected will be held in complete confidence -- under no
circumstances will your name be associated with any  specific response.
MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA E PESCAS
and
Michigan State University/USAID
Survey of Input Utilization in the Smallholder Sector
SG 2000, May 1997
MAP/MSU Food Security Project in Mozambique
National Directorates of Agricultural Economics/Rural Extension












Name of Extension Agent
NOMEXT
 
Questionnnaire type (1 = SG2000 participant, SG2000 plot, 2 = SG2000 participant, traditional plot, 3 = non-participant)                         
                            __________   QTYPE
Did you participate in the SG2000 program this year? Yes = 1 No = 0 _____   P9697   
Did you participate in SG2000 during the 95/96 season? Yes = 1 No = 0 _____   P959670
Table I. Demographic Data about the Household
Name No. Relationship  to
household head 
1 household           
head
2 spouse  
3 son/daughter
4  father/
    mother


















NOME MEM I1 I2 I3 AGECODE CONUNIT
AF1    _________ Household head’s level of education
0 Illiterate  
1,2,...12 Last year of school completed
99 Did not attend school, but knows how to read and writeProv           Distrito          Ald          AF        
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II.  FIELD MAP 
 EXTENSION AGENT: Using a compass and tape, measure all sides and angles of the SG2000 (or traditional) maize field, distinguishing between  parts of the field where
conventional tillage and no-till techniques were used (if applicable).  Sketch the field below, noting side and angle measurements.
==================================================================================Prov           Distrito          Ald          AF        
72
Table II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE SG2000 (OR TRADITIONAL) MAIZE FIELD 
Field Type Area in
hectares
Other crops in this
field
(intercropped) )
Soil type Was this field fertilized during the
95/96 season?








Household head’s estimate of total















50 50 kg sack




















system" (3)Prov           Distrito          Ald          AF        
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WORKSHEET: MAIZE FIELD ACTIVITIES (not entered as data)
Activity When was it carried out?
Month




1    1
st Plowing
2    2
nd Plowing
3    3
rd Plowing
4    Opening furrows
5    Hilling up
Tractor
6    1
st Plowing
7    2
nd Plowing
8    3
rd Plowing
9    Opening furrows
10  Hilling up
Other Activities Done by Hand
11 Clearing
12  Land Preparation
13 Planting
14 Planting and Application of Basal
Fertilizer AT THE SAME TIME
15  Application of Basal Fertilizer
16  1




19 Thinning  + Application of Top Dressing
AT THE SAME TIME
20  Application of Top Dressing and Hilling
Up AT THE SAME TIME
21  2
nd Application of Herbicide
22  2
nd Weeding
23  Application of Insecticide
24  First Harvest
25 First Transport (to House)
26  Second Harvest
27  Second Transport (to House)
28  Third Harvest





___Prov _____ Dist _____ Ald _____ AF _____ 
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Table III.  INPUTS UTILIZED IN THE SG2000 (OR TRADITIONAL) MAIZE FIELD 
Input




































































2  First Plowing




6  First Plowing
7  Second Plowing




   (Compound)
Type______________
12 Top Dressing
   (Simple)
Type_______________Prov _____ Dist _____ Ald _____ AF _____ 
Input













































































16 OtherProv _____ Dist _____ Ald _____ AF _____ 
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Comment If in-kind payment was
made
 How many days were













4Prov _____ Dist _____ Ald _____ AF _____ 
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V.     COMMENTS ABOUT THE NEW TECHNOLOGY
Table V.  IMPACT OF INPUTS ON YIELD 
Input Impact on YIELD
1  Improved yield










AF2  ----------    What are the STORAGE CHARACTERISTICS of Manica variety maize compared to traditional varieties? 
1 Manica variety stores better
2 No difference between Manica and traditional varieties
3 Manica variety doesn’t store as well as traditional varieties
4 Doesn’t know




3 Other (specify)Prov _____ Dist _____ Ald _____ AF _____ 
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AF4 _______ What are the MILLING (POUNDING) CHARACTERÍSTICS of Manica variety maize
compared to traditional varieties?
1 Manica variety pounds better
2 No difference between Manica and traditional varieties
3 Manica variety pounds more poorly than traditional varieties
4 Doesn’t know
AF5 _______ How does the color of Manica compare to traditional varieties?
1 Prefers Manica
2 Doesn’t see any difference
3 Prefers the traditional varieties
4 Doesn’t know
AF6 _______ How does the taste of Manica compare to traditional varieties?
1 Prefers Manica
2 No difference
3 Prefers the traditional varieties
4 Doesn’t know
AF7 _______ Did you cultivate a traditional variety(ies) of maize this year?
0 No (skip to question AF9)
1 Yes AF7a  Name                                                        
AF7b  Name                                                        
AF7c  Name                                                        








AF10 ______ How does the PRICE that traders pay for Manica compare to the price paid for traditional varieties?
1 Pay more for Manica
2 Pay the same
3 Pay less for Manica
4 Doesn’t know
AF11 ______ Did you use a storage insecticide or fungicide during the past year?
0N o
1 Yes Name and formulation  
AF12               Are you planning to use a storage insecticide or fungicide this year?
0N o
1 Yes Name and formulationProv _____ Dist _____ Ald _____ AF _____ 
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VI. FUTURE USE OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY
AF13 _______ If the SG2000 program continues next year, would you like to participate or do you prefer to leave the program? (SG2000 participants only)
 
1 Would like to participate (skip to Table VI)
2 Prefers to leave
AF14 If you prefer to leave, why? (SG2000 participants only)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
              
Table VI.  Future input use
Input If you had to pay for this
input immediately (instead of
receiving credit), would you
purchase it?
0 Would not buy
1 Would buy











AF15 Do you have additional comments about the SG2000 program or the technologies used in the program? (SG2000 participants only) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            80

































The following questions are for NON-PARTICIPANTS in SG2000 ONLY, qtype=3)




AF3a ______ Would you like to participate in the program next season?  (NON-
PARTICIPANT
in SG2000, qtype = 3)
0N o
1 Yes
AF4a Why or why not?    (NON-PARTICIPANT in SG2000, qtype = 3)
                                                                                                                                                
            82
APPENDIX 3
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC BUDGETS83
Table 16. Summary of Farm Level Enterprise Budget, High-Input Technology Package, 1996-97, by Region and Yield Tercile 
-------------------------Study Zone-------------------------
Region 4 Region 7 Region 8 Region 10
       ----------------------------------------Maize Yield Tercile----------------------------------------
Grand
Budget Item 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total Total
YIELD (quintals/ha)
 June 97
a 8.58 21.08 34.12 21.55 4.77 6.81 13.98 8.42 12.43 25.06 38.34 25.28 12.83 26.63 43.26 27.57 23.29
 Dec 97
b 8.08 19.85 32.12 20.29 4.49 6.41 13.16 7.93 11.70 23.59 36.10 23.80 12.08 25.07 40.73 25.96 21.93
Jul-Dec 97 Mean




   June 97 6.53 6.53 6.53 6.53 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.94 6.94 6.94 6.94 6.58 6.58 6.58 6.58 6.63
   Dec 97 24.19 24.19 24.19 24.19 13.94 13.94 13.94 13.94 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23 20.45 20.45 20.45 20.45 19.38




   June 97 Price  56.03 137.65 222.80 140.72 31.77 45.35 93.11    56.08 86.26  173.92  266.08  175.44 84.42 175.22 284.65 181.41 154.46
   Dec 97 Price
e 188.03 461.96 747.73 472.26 58.42 83.40 171.22 103.12 120.06 242.06 370.33 244.18 235.90 489.64 795.42 506.93 410.07
   Jul-Dec 97 Price
f 114.55 281.52 455.67 287.80 36.58 52.22 107.20 64.56 88.97 179.37 274.42 180.94 144.71 300.36 487.93 310.96 252.59
CASH COSTS 
(‘0000 mt/ha)
   Fertilizer & seed
g 135.40 135.40 135.40 135.40 104.40 104.40 104.40 104.40 104.40 104.40 104.40 104.40 124.85 124.85 124.85 124.85 122.16
   Animal traction
h 27.40 6.34 15.37 16.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.08 17.97 14.57 15.56 11.53
   Tractor 0.00 1.33 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 3.75 2.36 4.25 5.00 5.79 5.00 2.66
 INTEREST
      June 97
i 19.75 19.75 19.75 19.75 15.23 15.23 15.23 15.23 15.23 15.23 15.23 15.23 18.09 18.09 18.09 18.09 17.81
      Dec 97
j 36.67 36.67 36.67 36.67 28.28 28.28 28.28 28.28 28.28 28.28 28.28 28.28 33.60 33.60 33.60 33.08
      Jul-Dec Mean
k 31.03 31.03 31.03 31.03 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93 28.84 23.93 23.93 23.93 28.70
  LABOR 
   Purchased labor (‘0000            
    mt/ha)
l 11.15 93.55 14.79 11.78 2.80 3.61 17.56 7.71 11.45 19.31 18.13 16.29 17.89 16.74 25.32 19.90 15.54
   Family labor (ae days/ha)
m 75 101 95 91 80 73 96 82 71 38 52 54 76 105 104 95 86
    Mutual labor (ae days/ha)




   June 97 Price (137.67) (34.52) 37.50 (42.78) (90.66) (77.88) (44.08) (71.27) (44.81) 31.65 124.58 37.16 (93.97) (6.66) 96.80 (1.21) (15.25)
   Dec 97 Price (22.59) 272.86 545.50 271.84 (77.06) (52.89) 20.98 (37.27) (24.06) 86.74 215.78 92.85 41.99 292.24 592.05 308.79 225.09
   Jul-Dec 97 Price  (90.42) 98.06 259.08 93.02 (94.55) (79.72) (38.69) (71.48) (50.81) 28.40 124.22 33.96 (44.04) 108.12 289.72 117.98 75.51-------------------------Study Zone-------------------------
Region 4 Region 7 Region 8 Region 10
       ----------------------------------------Maize Yield Tercile----------------------------------------
Grand







   June 97 Price (1.79) (0.28) 0.37 (0.42) (1.13) (1.07) (0.42) (0.84) (0.55) 0.67 1.71 0.55 (1.04) (0.06) 0.87 (0.01) (-.13)
   Dec 97 Price (0.29) 2.20 5.35 2.67 (0.96) (0.72) 0.20 (0.44) (0.30) 1.85 2.96 1.39 0.47 2.59 5.33 2.97 2.25
   Jul-Dec 97 Price (1.17) 0.79 2.54 0.91 (1.18) (1.09) (0.37) (0.84) (0.63) 0.60 1.70 0.51 (0.49) 0.96 2.61 1.13 0.74
Median wage rate 
(‘0000 mt per 8 hour day)





n 14 15 15 44 5 6 5 16 8 8 8 24 21 21 21 63 147
Source: Field data from DNER/SG Survey; Prices from MAP/MSU FSP Market Information System
a Estimated from crop cuts
b 2/Assumed 1% grain weight loss from pests each month (personal communication, Rudy van Gent, Zambian Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries Research
Branch Food Conservation and Storage Unit
c Prices are from MAP/MSU/FSP Market Information System.  Region 4 prices are from Manica; Region 7 from Ribaue; Region 8 from Monapo. Region 10 price is a
weighted average of Manica and Malema prices.
d Yield * price.
e Adjusted to account for revenue lost by holding maize rather than selling it in June.  The foregone compounded earnings from investment of June 97 gross revenue at
25% annual rate of interest, for a 6-month period, are subtracted from the December 97 gross revenue.
f Adjusted to account for revenue lost by holding maize rather than selling it in June.  The foregone compounded earnings from investment of June 97 gross revenue at
25% annual rate of interest, for a 3- month period, are subtracted from the mean July-December  97 gross revenue.
g Includes 30 kg of improved seed, 100 kg 12-24-12, and 100 kg urea, all provided as part of the DNER/SG2000 package. 
h Calculated as follows: actual rental amount for farmers who paid cash for animal traction services; for farmers who owned oxen, depreciated value for oxen and tools
estimated as 1/3 of actual rental rate and multiplied by number of 8-hour days of oxen use.
i Assumes farmer receives inputs in November and repays loan in June, accumulating 7 months of interest.
j Assumes farmer receives inputs in November and repays loan in December of the following year, accumulating 13 months of interest.
k Assumes farmer receives inputs in November and repays loan the following October, accumulating 11 months of interest.
l Actual wages reported by farmers.
m adult equivalent days/hectare.
n Gross revenue-(cash costs+interest+purchased labor)
o Net income/adult equivalent family + mutual labor days 
p Based on wages paid in each region.  For Region 10, rates in parentheses are for parts of Region 10 in Nampula Province; others are for Manica Province.85
Table 17. Summary of Economic Budget, High-Input Technology Package, 1996-97, by Region and Yield Tercile 
Assuming Maize Deficit in Southern Africa 
-------------------------Study Zone-------------------------





         ----------------------------------------Maize Yield Tercile----------------------------------------
Budget Item 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total
YIELD
a




  Hi trans.
  costs
  (HTC)
d 13.17 13.17 13.17 13.17 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.20 13.17 13.17 13.17 13.17 4.20 4.20 4.20 4.20
  Lo trans.
  costs
  (LTC)
e 15.70 15.70 15.70 15.70 10.64 10.64 10.64 10.64 10.64 10.64 10.64 10.64 15.70 15.70 15.70 15.70 10.64 10.64 10.64 10.64
  Export to
  Malawi,
  LTC





  HTC  109.06 268.04 433.99 274.09 19.37 27.64 56.72 34.16 50.42 101.67 155.53 102.55 154.24 328.10 482.73 326.12 50.67 118.43 199.18 122.76
  LTC 130.01 319.52 517.36 326.74 49.06 70.02 143.66 86.51 127.70 257.51 393.94 259.75 183.87 391.12 575.45 388.76 128.33 299.98 504.50 310.94
  Export to
  Malawi 130.01 319.52 517.36 326.74 77.23 110.23 226.15 136.19 201.00 405.40 620.16 408.92 183.86 391.12 575.45 388.76 202.03 472.24 794.21 489.49
CASH COSTS
(‘0000 mt/ha)
  Fert. & seed
  HTC 
h 115.00 115.00 115.00 115.00 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 115.00 115.00 115.00 115.00 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94
  Fert. & seed
  LTC 
h 109.94 109.94 109.94 109.94 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 109.94 109.94 109.94 109.94 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06
  Animal
  traction 
i 27.40 6.34 15.38 16.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.95 25.47 30.42 24.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Tractor






k 11.15 9.36 14.79 11.78 2.80 3.61 17.56 7.72 11.45 19.31 18.13 16.29 22.57 21.81 14.30 19.48 3.86 20.09 37.99 20.65-------------------------Study Zone-------------------------





         ----------------------------------------Maize Yield Tercile----------------------------------------
Budget Item 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total
86
  Median
  wage rate
  (‘0000 mt per
  8 hour day)
l 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.60 0.60 0.60 6.00
  Value of
  family and
  mutual labor
  (‘0000 mt/ha)





  HTC (121.50) 12.00 186.83 28.74 (157.78) (146.70) (148.13) (150.50) (158.78) (91.51) (57.69) (102.65) (64.58) 92.73 236.11 92.19 (106.23) (67.60) 0.42 (58.01)
  LTC (95.49) 68.55 275.26 86.45 (115.21) (91.44) (48.31) (85.26) (68.62) 77.21 193.60 67.43 (29.89) 160.81 333.90 159.88 (15.69) 126.82 318.62 143.05
  Export to
  Malawi (95.49) 68.55 275.26 86.45 (87.05) (51.23) 34.18 (35.58) 4.71 225.09 419.82 216.60 (29.89) 160.81 333.90 159.89 58.01 299.08 608.33 321.61
  n 14.00 15.00 15.00 44.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 16.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 24.00 12.00 13.00 13.00 38.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 21.00
Source: Field data from DNER/SG Survey
a Estimated from crop cuts.  Assumes storage losses of 1% per month and that maize is stored on average 2.5 months.  
B Import parity price.  Assumes that in deficit years Mozambican maize competes with maize imported from the U.S.  For calculation of import parity price under different assumptions see
Appendix 2.
c Throughout the economic analysis it is assumed that no adjustment for overvaluation of the exchange rate is required (J. Coates, World Bank, personal communication 4/2/98).
d Calculation of import parity price assuming high transport costs, adapted from Coulter 1995 (Appendix 2). 
e Calculation of import parity price assuming low transport costs, adapted from Coulter 1995 (Appendix 2).  
f Assumes Nampula Province farmers export to Malawi in times of regional deficit (export parity price) and that transport costs are low.  Manica Province farmers face import parity prices.
(Appendix 2)  
g Yield * price.  
h Includes 30 kg of improved seed, 100 kg 12-24-12, and 100 kg urea, all provided as part of the DNER/SG package.   
i Calculated as follows: actual rental amount for farmers who paid cash for animal traction services; for farmers who owned oxen, depreciated value for oxen and tools estimated as 1/3 of
actual rental rate and multiplied by number of 8-hour days of oxen use.  Assumes that the animal rental rate accurately reflects the economic value of these services.  
J Actual rental amounts paid by farmers.  Assumes that the tractor rental rate accurately reflects the economic value of these services.
K Actual wages reported by farmers.  
l Based on wages paid in each zone.  
m Family and mutual labor was valued at .5 of the median wage rate for each zone.
n Gross revenue - (cash costs + purchased labor + value of family and mutual labor).87
Table 18. Summary of Economic Budget, High-Input Technology Package, 1996-97, by Region and Yield Tercile 
Assuming Maize Surplus in Southern Africa
-------------------------Study Zone-------------------------





                 ----------------------------------------Maize Yield Tercile----------------------------------------
Budget Item 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total
YIELD (qt/ha)
a 8.28 20.35 32.95 20.81 4.61 6.58 13.50 8.13 12.00 24.20 37.02 24.41 11.71 24.91 36.65 24.76 12.06 28.19 47.41 29.22
PRICE (mt/qt)
b,c
  Hi trans.costs
  (HTC) 
d 8.29    8.29   8.29   8.29   (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) 8.29 8.29 8.29 8.29 (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68)
  Lo trans.costs
  (LTC) 
e 10.82    10.82 10.82 10.82 5.76   5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 10.82    10.82 10.82 10.82 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76
  Export to int’l
  market LTC 
f 10.82    10.82 10.82 10.82 7.71    7.71 7.71 7.71 7.71 7.71 7.71 7.71 10.82 10.82 10.82 10.82 7.71    7.71 7.71 7.71
GROSS REVENUE
  (‘0000 mt/ha)
g 
  HTC 68.68 168.79 273.30 172.60 (3.12) (4.45) (9.12) (5.49) (8.11) (16.35) (25.02) (16.49) 97.13 206.61 303.98 205.37 (8.15) (19.05) (32.04) (19.75)
  LTC 89.62 220.27 356.66 225.25 26.58 37.93 77.82 46.86 69.17 139.50 213.39 140.71 126.75 269.63 396.71 268.01 69.52 162.49 273.28 168.43
  Export to int’l mkt 89.62 220.27 356.66 225.25 35.54 50.73 104.09 62.68 92.52 186.58 285.42 188.20 126.75 269.63 396.71 268.01 92.98 217.34 365.53 225.29
CASH COSTS
  (‘0000 mt/ha)
  Fert. & seed
  HTC 
h 115.00 115.00 115.00 115.00 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94 115.00 115.00 115.00 115.00 132.94 132.94 132.94 132.94
  Fert. & seed
  LTC 
h 109.94 109.94 109.94 109.94 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06 109.94 109.94 109.94 109.94 120.06 120.06 120.06 120.06
  Animal traction 
i 27.40 6.34 15.37 16.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.95 25.47 30.42 24.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Tractor 
j 0.00 1.33 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 3.75 2.37 7.08 7.69 7.69 7.50 0.00 0.00 1.43 0.48
LABOR
  Purchased
  labor 
  (‘0000 mt/ha)










m 77.00 124.00 102.00 102.00 41.41 37.78 54.34 44.00 64.80 37.60 58.40 53.60 58.20 65.40 79.20 67.80 20.10 33.00 26.40 26.70-------------------------Study Zone-------------------------





                 ----------------------------------------Maize Yield Tercile----------------------------------------





HTC (161.88) (87.24) 26.13 (72.75) (180.27) (178.79) (213.97) (190.15) (217.30) (209.54) (238.24) (221.69) (121.69) (28.76) 57.37 (28.57) (165.05) (205.08) (230.80) (200.51)
LTC (135.87) (30.70) 114.56 (15.04) (137.70) (123.53) (114.15) (124.91) (127.14) (40.81) 13.05 (51.61) (87.00) 39.32 155.16 39.13 (74.50) (10.66) 87.40 0.54
Export to int’l mkt (135.87) (30.70) 114.56 (15.04) (128.73) (110.73) (87.89) (109.10) (103.79) 62.76 85.08 (41.19) (87.00) 39.32 155.16 39.13 (51.04) 44.19 179. 65 57.40
n
14 15 15 44 5 6 5 16 8 8 8 24 12 13 13 38 7 7 7 21
Source: Field data from DNER/SG Survey
a Estimated from crop cuts.  Assumes storage losses of 1% per month and that maize is stored on average 2.5 months.
B Import parity price.  Assumes that in surplus years Mozambican maize competes with maize imported from South Africa.  For calculation of import parity price under different assumptions see
Appendix 2.
c Throughout the economic analysis it is assumed that no adjustment for overvaluation of the exchange rate is required (J. Coates, World Bank, personal communication 4/2/98).
d Calculation of import parity price assuming high transport costs, adapted from Coulter 1995 (Appendix 2).
e Calculation of import parity price assuming low transport costs, adapted from Coulter 1995 (Appendix 2).
f Assumes Nampula Province farmers export to the international market in times of regional surplus (export parity price) through the port at Nacala and that transport
costs are low.  Manica Province farmers face import parity prices. Import parity price used for Manica Province.(Appendix 2)
g Yield * price.
h Includes 30 kg of improved seed, 100 kg 12-24-12, and 100 kg urea, all provided as part of the DNER/SG package. 
i Calculated as follows: actual rental amount for farmers who paid cash for animal traction services; for farmers who owned oxen, depreciated value for oxen and
tools estimated as 1/3 of actual rental rate and multiplied by number of 8-hour days of oxen use.  Assumes that the animal rental rate accurately reflects the economic
value of these services.
j Actual rental amounts paid by farmers.  Assumes that the tractor rental rate accurately reflects the economic value of these services.
k Actual wages reported by farmers.
l Based on wages paid in each zone.
m Family and mutual labor was valued at .5 of the median wage rate for each zone.
n Gross revenue - (cash costs + purchased labor + value of family and mutual labor).89
APPENDIX 4
CALCULATION OF ECONOMIC PRICES FOR MAIZE, FERTILIZER, AND SEED90
CALCULATION OF ECONOMIC PRICES FOR MAIZE, FERTILIZER, AND SEED
Assumptions 
a
Long distance road haulage cost in US/ton/km, 
using backhaul 
  Low estimate 0.03 
  High estimate 0.05 
Distance by road from Nampula to Maputo (km) 2150 
Distance by road from Chimoio to Maputo (km) 1100 
Cost of shipping from Nampula to Maputo by 
land/sea
  assuming large operation (e.g., 1500 tons, $/ton) 63 
Exchange rate 1997 Mt/$ 
b 11500 
Cost of bags for informal traders -- $/ton of 
grain handled
8 
PART 1. CALCULATION OF IMPORT AND EXPORT PARITY PRICES FOR MAIZE
1.  Maputo and Nacala FOB,CIF prices
Calculation of Maputo import parity price of
 white maize, 1997 
a 
Deficit Year Surplus Year
Item USD/ton
Yellow maize, FOB Gulf 
c 117 
Premium for white maize  10 
Freight and insurance, Gulf to Maputo 
d 50.85 
Port charges and bagging  14 
Transport from port to warehouse  3 
Maputo import parity price, white maize 194.45 
2.  Determination of Economic On-Farm Prices Based on Import Parity 
(a) Calculation of wholesale price in Maputo at import parity (USD/metric ton) 
a
Farmer price of yellow maize, South Africa 71 
Handling, storage, fumigation 17 
Bagging 11 
Cost FOR 99 
Profit margin (7.5% of FOR) 7 
Yellow maize, FOB Gulf  117 
Premium for white maize  10  10 
Freight and insurance, Gulf to Maputo  51  29 
CIF price 177  145 
Port charges and bagging  14 
Transport from port to warehouse  3  3 
Cost delivered to warehouse 194  148 
Wholesale margin  19  15 
Wholesale price 214  163 
(b)  Calculation of price to farmer in Western Nampula Province assuming low transport costs 
(trader shipping by sea)
a
Wholesale price in Maputo 214  163 
Overheads/profit margin of trader (20%) 36  28 
Trader's direct cost delivered to Maputo 178  135 
Transport from Malema to Maputo 67  67 
Transport from field to railhead  10  10 91
Bags 8 8 
Price paid to farmer 93  50 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 1064  576 
(c) Calculation of price to farmer in Western Nampula Province assuming high transport costs
assuming informal trader shipping to Maputo by truck 
a 
Wholesale price in Maputo  214 163 
Overheads/profit margin of trader (20%) 36  28 
Transport from Nampula province 108  108 
Transport to pick up point on main highway 25  25 
Bags 8 8 
Price paid to farmer 37  -6 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 420  -68 
(d) Calculation of price to farmer in Manica province, assuming low transport costs (selling by
roadside to informal trader shipping to Maputo by truck)
a 
Wholesale price in Maputo 214  163 
Overheads/profit margin of trader (20%) 36  28 
Transport from point of purchase to Maputo 33  33 
Bags 8 8 
Price paid to farmer 137  94 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 1570  1082 
(e) Calculation of price to farmer in Manica province, assuming high transport costs 
(selling by roadside to informal trader shipping to Maputo by truck)
a
Wholesale price in Maputo 214  163 
Overheads/profit margin of trader (20%) 36  28 
Transport from point of purchase to Maputo 55  55 
Bags 8 8 
Price paid to farmer 115  72 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 1317  829 
3. Determination of Economic On-Farm Prices Based on Export Parity 
(a)  Maximum Price to Northern Farmers Supplying the Int'l Market 
a 
Price FOB Nacala 127 
Wholesaler/exporter's margine (20%) 21 
Subtotal 106 
Unloading and loading on ship 11 
Rail from Malema to Nacala 7 
Transport from primary buyer's store to railhead 6 
Primary buyer's mark-up incl. bags 15 
Price paid to farmer 67 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 771 
(b)  Maximum Price to Northern Farmers Based on Export to Malawi 
a
Price FOB Gulf 127 
Ocean freight and insurance 51 
Port unload to rail including bagging 14 
Rail Nacala-border with Malawi 10 
Total 202 
Less:  informal trader's margin (20%) 33 
rail from Malema to border 5 
transport from field to railhead 10 
bags 8 
Price paid to farmer 146 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 1675 92
PART 2. CALCULATION OF IMPORT PARITY PRICES FOR FERTILIZER
1.  Maputo CIF price--fertilizer imported from South Africa
12-24-12 Urea
Item USD/ton
Fertilizer, South Africa 
e 250 230 
Freight and insurance, Sasolburg to Maputo  (rail)
f 48.5 47.5 
Transport from port to warehouse 
a 3 3 
Maputo import parity price, fertilizer 301.5  280.5 
2. Determination of Economic On-Farm Prices Based on Import Parity (US$/ton)
(a) Calculation of wholesale price in Maputo at import parity
12-24-12 Urea
Fertilizer, FOB, South Africa 250  230 
Freight and insurance, Sasolburg to Maputo  (rail)
b 48.5 47.5 
Transport from port to warehouse  3  3 
Cost delivered to warehouse 302  281 
Wholesale margin 8  7 
Wholesale price 309  288 
(b)  Calculation of price to farmer in Western Nampula Province assuming low transport costs
(trader shipping by sea) 
a
Wholesale price in Maputo 309  288 
Overheads/profit margin of trader (20%) 53  49 
Transport from Maputo to Malema 67  67 
Transport from railhead to field 10  10 
Price paid by farmer 439  413 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 5044  4754 
Wholesale price in Maputo 309  288 
Overheads/profit margin of trader (20%) 53  49 
Transport to Nampula province 108  108 
Transport from Nampula to farmgate 25  25 
Price paid by farmer 495  469 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 5688  5398
 
(c) Calculation of price to farmer in Manica province, assuming low transport costs 
Wholesale price in Maputo 309  288 
Overheads/profit margin of trader (20%) 53  49 
Transport from Maputo to point of sale 33  33 
Price paid by farmer 395  369 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 4538  4248 
(d) Calculation of price to farmer in Manica province, assuming high transport costs 
Wholesale price in Maputo 309  288 
Overheads/profit margin of trader (20%) 53  49 
Transport from Maputo to point of sale 55  55 
Price paid by farmer 417  391 
Price in mt per kilo@ Mt 11500 4791  4501 
Notes 
a Except where noted, from Coulter 199593
b  from OANDA currency converter,
http://www.oanda.com/cgi_bin/ncc.  It is assumed that no
adjustment for overvaluation is required per personal
communication, J. Coates, World Bank 4/2/98
c Average May 1997-January 1998 from FAO/GIEWS
d Freight charges Gulf-Maputo $45 (AMIC 1998).  Insurance
estimated at 5% FOB Gulf price
e Personal communication, J. Abel, Omnia, based on 12/96
price for urea and 4/98 price for 12-24-12.  Urea price based
on actual exports; 
f 12-24-12 price is an estimate only.  The product is not
widely traded and 12-24-12 needs are currently supplied by
KRII imports.
g Freight charges Sasolburg-Maputo USD 36.  Insurance
estimated at 5% FOB Sasolburg price.  
PART 3. CALCULATION OF ECONOMIC PRICE FOR MANICA SEED
1.  Calculation of Economic Seed Price for 
Nampula and Manica Provinces (meticais)
a
MT/kg




cost of 30 kgs 180180 
Transport to from district center to farmgate
c 34700 
Total cost seed 220886 94
APPENDIX 5
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS FROM THE DNER/SG SURVEY95
Region 4 Region 7 Region 8 Region 10
Total Total Total Total
Grand
Total
Would like to continue in DNER/SG











Specific comments (% of responses)
a
Deliver inputs earlier 36.9 66.7 24.1 15.4 30.4
Provide inputs for larger area or for
other crops 21.7 22.2 24.1 25.0 23.4
Assist with marketing 17.4 5.6 20.7 25.0 19.3
Provide loans for animals, antrac
equipment 15.2 10.3 15.4 12.4
Input cost too high 4.3 13.8 7.7 6.9
Facilitation of credit
important 2.2 3.4 3.8 2.8
Spacing recommendations  incorrect  2.2 5.6 3.4 1.9 2.8
Seed was poor quality 5.7 2.1
Total % 99.9 100.1 99.8 99.9 100.1
n 
b 46.0 18.0 29.0 52.0 145.0
Source: DNER/SG Survey
a Respondents gave up to 3 comments each.  These were pooled, unweighted, for this analysis. 
B All respondents were asked for general comments about the DNER/SG program or technology
used in the program, but only cases for which a yield estimate by crop cut was available were
analyzed in this table.  An additional 27 cases gave non-useful responses, e.g., the
program/technology was good, or they planned to continue in the program.  These responses were
excluded from the analysis.
Table 19. Comments about the DNER/SG Program by Region
Table 20. Farmer Opinions about Fertilizer, by Region
Region 4 Region 7 Region 8 Region 10 Grand Total
Total Total Total Total
IMPACT ON
YIELD (%)
Improved 67.8 53.3 75.0 87.8 72.9
No impact 5.1 28.9 10.0 5.4 11.0
Reduced  6.8 13.3 5.0 0.0 5.5
Doesn’t know 20.3 4.4 10.0 6.8 10.6




(%) 75.5 86.4 67.5 93.0 82.2





inputs 29.4 28.9 47.5 31.5 33.5







Total Total Total Total Grand Total
IMPACT ON YIELD (%)
Improved 52.5 48.9 77.5 70.3 62.4
No impact  11.9 26.7 5.0 9.5 12.8
Reduced 6.8 20.0 10.0 8.1 10.6
Doesn’t know 28.8 4.4 7.5 12.2 14.2
Would purchase  with own
resources if credit  unavailable (%) 83.3 88.9 67.5 87.7 83.0
% ranking Manica first in order of
importance among purchased
inputs 75.9 73.3 44.7 71.2 68.1
STORAGE 
Better than local varieties 12.1 13.3 12.5 41.9 22.6
No difference 0.0 8.9 2.5 2.7 3.2
Worse than local varieties 24.1 53.3 60.0 17.6 34.6
Doesn’t know 63.8 24.4 25.0 37.8 39.6
MILLING
Prefer Manica to local varieties 20.3 20.0 43.6 38.4 30.6
No difference   3.4 2.2 7.7 2.7 3.7
Worse than local varieties 11.9 22.2 28.2 6.8 15.3
Doesn’t know 64.4 55.6 20.5 52.1 50.5
COLOR
Prefer Manica to local varieties 28.1 75.6 70.0 43.2 50.9
No difference 19.3 13.3 20.0 24.3 19.9
Prefer local varieties 8.8 8.9 0.0 1.4 4.6
Doesn’t know 43.9 2.2 10.0 31.1 24.5
TASTE
Prefer Manica to local varieties 20.3 57.8 70.0 47.3 46.3
No difference 15.3 8.9 15.0 12.2 12.8
Prefer local varieties 8.5 0.0 5.0 1.4 3.7
Doesn’t know 55.9 33.3 10.0 39.2 37.2
n 57.0 45.0 39.0 73.0 214.0
Source: DNER/SG Survey
Table 21. Farmer Opinions about Manica Seed, by Region97
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